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Scholars highlight an "innocence problem" as one of plea bargaining's
chieffailures. Their concerns, however, are misguided. In fact, many innocent
defendants are better off in a world with plea bargainingthan one without it.
Plea bargainingis not the cause of wrongful punishment. Rather, inaccurate
guilty pleas are merely symptomatic of errors at the points of arrest, charge, or
trial. Much of the worry over an innocence problem proceeds from misperceptions over (1) the characteristicsof typical innocent defendants; (2) the types of
cases they generallyface; and (3) the level of due process they ordinarilydesire.
In reality, most innocent defendants are recidivists, because institutionalbiases
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select for the arrest and charge of these repeatplayers. And most cases arepetty.
In these low-stakes cases, recidivist innocent defendants face high pretrialprocess costs (particularlyif the defendants are detained). But innocent defendants
also enjoy low plea prices because prosecutors do not try to maximize sentence
length in low-stakes cases. Moreover, defendants possess certain underappreciated bargainingadvantages in these cases. In the end, the costs of proceeding
to trial often swamp the costs of pleading to lenient bargains. Put differently,
many recidivist innocent defendants are punished by process and released by
pleas. Thus, plea bargainingis no source of wrongful punishment; rather, it
may be a normative good that cuts erroneous punishment short. Accordingly,
the system must provide innocent defendants access to plea bargaining. Current vehicles for rational choice pleas-like no-contest pleas and equivocal
pleas- are not up to the task. Instead, the system should reconceive of false
pleas as legalfictions and require defense lawyers to advise and assist innocent
defendants who wish to enter into plea bargainsand mouth dishonest on-therecord words of guilt.
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INTRODUCTION

Much has been made of an "innocence problem" in plea bargaining.1 Even scholars who view plea bargaining as systemically positive
nevertheless propose reforms to limit access only to the factually
guilty.2 But the conventional view is largely wrong. On balance, plea
bargaining is a categorical good for many innocent defendants, particularly in low-stakes cases.
No doubt, punishment of the innocent is a tragedy and a failure.
Yet, inaccurate guilty pleas are merely symptomatic of errors at the
points of arrest, charge, or trial-not at the point of plea bargaining.
The relevant plea-bargaining question is only how bad the failure will
be-how great the tragedy. From that understanding, the inescapable, if seemingly unsavory, ultimate conclusion is that many innocent
defendants are better off in a world with plea bargaining than one
without it.

For the typical innocent defendant in the typical case-which I
will demonstrate is a recidivist facing petty charges-the best resolu-

I See,

e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial:

Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932-34 (1983); John L.
Barkai, Accuracy Inquiriesfor All Felony and MisdemeanorPleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent
Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 88-90 (1977); Stephanos Bibas, HarmonizingSubstantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere
Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1382-86 (2003);John G. Douglass, FatalAttraction? The
Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining,50 EMORY L.J. 437, 444-52 (2001); Daniel
Givelber, Punishing Protestationsof Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences,
37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1363, 1364-71, 1384 (2000); Kenneth Kipnis, CriminalJustice and
the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 97-100 (1976); Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption
and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 42 (2001); David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 115, 132 (1994);
Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
957, 986-90 (1989); Stephen J. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 52 (1988) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Regulatory System];
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster; 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1992 (1992)
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Disaster]; Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV.
485, 494 (2000); Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35
CONN. L. REv. 1321, 1336 (2003); Fred C. Zacharias,Justice in PleaBargaining,39 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1121, 1151-55 (1998).
2 See Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L.
&
ECON. 353 (2006) (proposing a screening model to limit plea bargaining to the guilty);
Oren Gazal-Ayal, PartialBan on Plea Bargains,27 CARDOzO L. REV. 2295 (2006) (same);
Thomas R. McCoy & MichaelJ. Mirra, Plea Bargainingas Due Process in Determining Guilt,
32 STAN. L. REv. 887, 925-26 (1980) ("[P]lea bargaining is constitutionally defensible... [but] demands the development of guidelines expressly designed to ensure
that the incremental inaccuracy of plea bargaining does not exceed the limits tolerated
by procedural due process.").
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tion is generally a quick plea in exchange for a light, bargained-for
sentence. And such a plea is frequently available because prosecutors
do not try to maximize sentence length in low-stakes cases. Moreover,
defendants possess certain underappreciated bargaining advantages
in these cases. Finally, even for innocent defendants facing more serious charges, plea bargaining may be, at a minimum, the manifestly
least-bad option.
In making these claims, I do not wish to enter the larger debate
over plea bargaining.3 Specifically, I do not address many of the numerous and weighty objections to the practice. 4 My position is far
more modest: I seek only to demonstrate that the conventional criticism-that there is an innocence problem in plea bargaining-is off
the mark. Whatever other negative commentary may justifiably be offered against plea bargaining, it makes little sense to lament bargained-for discounts that permit the innocent to end cases on defendant-optimal terms.
Rather, these great discounts for innocent
defendants are facets of plea bargaining that may recommend the practice-at least in low-stakes cases. As such, viable bargaining outlets
should exist for the innocent.
It is hardly a new observation that guilty pleas may prove attractive
to the innocent. 5 But I intend to do more. I intend to pinpoint which
innocent defendants draw the most benefit from plea bargaining and
in what types of cases. In doing so, I rely on well-developed literature
concerning process costs and prosecutors' bargaining incentives, but I
also bring a fresh perspective to the scholarship by focusing on two underappreciated aspects of plea bargaining for the innocent: (1) that
innocent defendants are probably recidivists facing petty charges; and
(2) that, even in the face of agency failure, defendants possess certain
bargaining advantages over prosecutors in low-stakes cases. I then
For a pithy, yet comprehensive, summary of plea bargaining's perceived ills,
see
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 932-34. For some of the strongest critiques of the practice,
see id. at 931-1050; John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3
(1978); and Schulhofer, Disaster,supra note 1, at 1980-91. For some of the strongest (at
least partial) support, see Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "BargainJustice," 13 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 509 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, CriminalProcedure as a Market System,
12J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983); and Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, PleaBargaining
as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910-11 (1992).
4 Indeed, I credit a number of these objections but stress that they
have nothing to
do with innocence. See, e.g., infta notes 77, 196-208, and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., H. RIcHARD UvtLLER, VIRTUALJUSTICE 192 (1996);
Albert W. Alschuler,
The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE LJ. 1179, 1278-1306 (1975); Alschuler, supra note 1, at 951; Douglass, supra note 1, at 448 n.43; Easterbrook, supra note
3, at 320; McMunigal, supra note 1, at 989-90; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1934.
3
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raise a novel challenge to the much-maligned quasi-available current
channels for rational-choice pleas-specifically, equivocal and nocontest pleas. I fault these pleas not because-as the typical complaint goes-they facilitate guilty pleas for the innocent, but rather
because they do not make these false pleas easy or equitable enough.
Finally, I offer a practical proposal to reconceive of false pleas as legal
fictions and to require defense lawyers to advise and assist innocent
defendants who wish to mouth dishonest on-the-record words of guilt.
These are my principal contributions. 6
Much of the worry over an innocence problem in plea bargaining
proceeds from misperceptions over (1) the characteristics of typical
innocent defendants, (2) the types of cases they generally face, and
(3) the level of due process they typically desire. First, most innocent
defendants are probably recidivists. These repeat players are the
principal target population of police activities and investigations.
And, as such, they are more likely to be caught erroneously in miscast
or overwide police nets. 7 As recidivists, they face unique burdens
when challenging false charges but-perhaps counterintuitivelyenjoy concurrent unique plea-bargaining benefits. On the burden
side, they are more likely to be charged or indicted postarrest and less

6 Professors Alschuler, Scott, and Stuntz have devoted the most rigorous and considered attention to bargaining benefits for the innocent. Alschuler, in particular,
made a number of similar points to the points I make, but he used them as ammunition against plea bargaining generally. See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1278-1306. Conversely, I take these points-and others that Alschuler did not make-as positive attributes of the practice. For instance, I reach different conclusions concerning the
value of equivocal versus false pleas and the consequences of imperfect agency in lowstakes cases. Compare id. at 1182-94, 1201-03 (worrying that agency failure may lead innocent defendants to strike ill-advised bargains), and Albert W. Alschuler, Strainingat
Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of ProfessorBibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1412, 1420-24 (2003) (favoring equivocal pleas as a means of allowing the innocent to
plead guilty honestly), with infra Part IV (arguing that agency failure has little impact
and may even lower plea prices in low-stakes cases), and infra Part VII (raising several
deficiencies of equivocal pleas and instead proposing systemic acceptance of false
pleas). Moreover, Alschuler never explored my central point concerning the interplay
between recidivism and innocence. See infta Part I.
Professors Scott and Stuntz, for their part, discuss plea bargaining for the innocent
in a limited context only: they offer a persuasive defense of bargaining generally and
posit that the innocent also may benefit from the practice. But they worry that inculpable defendants are more likely to seize bad pleas because they are risk averse. See
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1943, 1967-68. I disagree with their underlying premise
that the innocent are apt to plead on bad terms. See infra note 175. In any event, they
do not explore when and why it makes sense for the innocent to plead guilty, and they
make no proposal for a means of access to such pleas.
7 See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying
text.
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likely to have pending charges dismissed, even when evidence is
weak.' Additionally, they are more likely to face pretrial detention
and are less able to adequately fight their cases at trial. 9 On the benefits side, recidivists suffer less-if at all-from the corollary consequences of convictions.'0
Second, most plea bargains terminate petty cases in exchange for
trivial sentences, notwithstanding academic and popular overattention
to uncommon instances of high-stakes bartering over years in prison
in high-profile cases."
Third, the pretrial process is painful. Punishment does not begin
with sentence. Many defendants-even the innocent-do not welcome a process that frequently constitutes most, if not all, of the punishment they will face. For the typical innocent recidivist defendant
facing the typical petty
charge, the more abbreviated the process, the
2
less the punishment.
In low-stakes cases there is only half-truth to the conventional perception of prosecutors as rational wealth maximizers whose chief pleabargaining aims are to achieve the greatest possible conviction rates
and sentence lengths. Specifically, prosecutors may try to maximize
conviction rates.' 3 But they do not aim principally-or even at all-to
maximize sentence lengths where the charges are minor. Instead,
prosecutors often provide bargain concessions that far exceed what is
necessary to motivate pleas. 14
Prosecutors make such lenient offers because they can. They enjoy little public or official scrutiny in low-stakes cases. In these cases,
prosecutors are much more interested in reducing their own administrative costs while earning some type (any type) of undelayed conviction. The adversarial model breaks down, or at least becomes a secondary consideration to workgroup cooperative principles. For all
involved, the best pleas are quick pleas. And quick pleas are most efSee infra Part I.B-C.
See infra Part I.D.
10See infta notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
11 See infra note 29 and accompanying text; see also
8
9

MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE
PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 5 (1979)

(noting that the criminal justice system is discussed typically in terms of the "big" cases
that in fact "are exceptional-indeed almost unique" (internal quotation marks omitted)); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 11 (1978) ("Most studies of plea bargaining have been limited to the disposition of felonies. ..").
12See infra Part II, and particularly note 75 and accompanying
text.
:3 See infta notes 38-45, 158-160, and accompanying text.
4 See infta
Part III.
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ficiently reached at low market prices, because-although prosecutors
may abandon sentence maximization-defendants always remain sentence minimizers. 15 The threat that defendants might demur leads
even self-interested defense attorneys and prosecutors to set prices low
of
ex ante as the most efficient way to ensure that the largest number
6
hesitation.1
of
amount
least
the
with
guilty
plead
defendants
As stakes rise, however, plea bargaining comes to resemble more
closely the orthodox ideal of adversarial gamesmanship: prosecutors
more often yield only enough to purchase pleas and use overcharging
to compel defendants' acceptance of high prices. In these serious
cases, bargaining provides an escape only from the prohibitive risk of
substantial trial penalties, not from trial processes that defendants
might otherwise welcome. Bargaining may be rational here, but it creates no normative good. Yet, significantly, this overcharging criticism is
an objection to bargaining and charging discretion generally.17 The
problem affects all defendants; it is not exclusive to the innocent.
If it is normatively appropriate for the innocent to plead guilty in
low-stakes cases, and rational-albeit normatively problematic for reasons unrelated to guilt and innocence-for the innocent to plead
guilty in high-stakes cases, then the system must provide effective avenues for innocent defendants to plead guilty." Two possible avenues
are nolo contendere (or no-contest) pleas and so-called Alford (or
equivocal) pleas. 9 However, both plea types present problems. First,
they are inconsistently available, leaving haphazard disparities both
within and across jurisdictions between those innocent defendants
permitted to plead guilty and those forced to trial. Second, both types
of pleas lead to unanticipated postconviction consequences. Third,
Alford pleas raise the possibility that courts are erroneously accepting
constitutionally impermissible involuntary pleas. °
Ultimately, the best avenue to guarantee equal access to plea bargaining and guilty pleas is regularization and systemic acceptance of a
common-though neither uniform nor conventionally welcomeunderground practice: permitting innocent defendants to offer false
on-the-record admissions of guilt. This recommendation is wholly

See infra Part IA-B.
See infta Part VA-B.
17 See infra Part
V.
Is See infra notes 212-238 and accompanying
text.
19 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970).
20 See infra Part VIIA.
15

16
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ethical if the system reconceives of false admissions as utilitarian legal
fictions.21
This article has seven Parts. In Part I, I discuss selection biases
that lead to the disproportionate arrest, prosecution, and trial conviction of recidivist innocent defendants. In Part II, I assess defendants'
process costs and explain when these costs most influence defendants'
decision making. In Part III, I explore prosecutors' incentives to offer
lenient bargains in low-stakes cases. In Part IV, I detail defendants'
bargaining advantages in low-stakes cases. In Part V, I consider the
particularly serious cases where process costs are of no significant consequence and where, conversely, overcharging and trial penalties become genuine concerns. In Part VI, I address objections to permitting
innocent defendants to plead guilty. In Part VII, I explain why Alford
and nolo contendere pleas are inadequate to ensure access to rational-choice guilty pleas. Instead, I propose ethical and systemic acceptance of false pleas as a means of guaranteeing innocent defendants' equal access to the benefits of bargaining.
I. THE USUAL SUSPECTS

There is no longer any serious question that innocent people are
charged with and convicted of crimes. 22 These instances of wrongful
conviction may be uncommon, but even so, they likely affect thousands of people per year nationwide. 3 Still, public perceptions of the
characteristics of the innocent accused remain fuzzy, if not inaccurate.
Commonly, the media portrays the innocent accused as the railroaded
"good person"-the law-abiding citizen robbed of liberty and tossed in
a dank cell by incompetent or even crooked prosecutors and police. 24

See infra Part VII.B.
See, e.g.,
Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do
We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent ? 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1342-58 (1997); Samuel R. Gross,
Lost Lives: MiscarriagesofJustice in CapitalCases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 129-33
(1998); Andrew D. Leipold, How the PretrialProcess Contributesto Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CpRM. L. REV. 1123, 1158-63 (2005).
23 See Givelber, supra note 22, at 1343 (citing studies
estimating the rate of conviction of innocent defendants to be between 0.5% and 7.9% of all cases, and noting that
even the lowest estimate entails conviction of several thousand per year).
24 Any number of films reinforce this misperception. See, e.g., CATCH
A FIRE (Focus Features 2006); THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1993); THE HURRICANE
(Universal Pictures 1999); MY COUSIN VINNY (Twentieth Century Fox 1992); THE
SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Columbia Pictures 1994). But cf JOHNNY CASH, Joe Bean, on
AT FOLSOM PRISON (CBS 2006) ("Yes, they're hanging Joe Bean this morning, for a
21
22
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Undoubtedly, such cases exist. But they are the rarest type of a rare
category. In fact, recidivists are the most likely innocent defendants.
First, recidivists comprise the majority of criminal defendants overall.
Specifically, in 2002, in the nation's seventy-five largest counties, seventy-six percent of state-court felony defendants had at least one prior
arrest, fifty percent had five arrests or more, fifty-nine percent had at
least one prior conviction, and twenty-four percent had five or more
convictions.'
Second, this recidivist majority is overrepresented
among the population of wrongfully accused, because institutional biases select for erroneous
arrest, prosecution, and trial conviction of
2 6
recidivist defendants.
A. Arrest Biases
Recidivists are common first targets when crime happens, or even
when they are simply on public sidewalks or in building lobbies in
high-crime areas. 2' They are stopped because they are known to police or just because they are more likely to look the criminal part. 21
This on-the-beat selection bias for repeat players is most pronounced
when police enforce minor crime-particularly the petty public-order

shooting that he never did. He killed twenty men, by the time he was ten, he was an
unruly kid.").
25 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2002, at 12-13 tbls.10-11 (2006), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdluc02.pdf [hereinafter DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS].
National misdemeanor data are unavailable. In fact, I could find detailed data for New
York City only. Accordingly, throughout the article, I draw on this source. In 1998,
46% of misdemeanor defendants in New York City had some kind of criminal record.
N.Y. CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: TRENDS IN CASE AND
DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING AND OUTCOMES, IN
NON-FELONY ARRESTS PROSECUTED IN NEW YORK CIrY'S CRIMINAL COURTS, at fig.3a
(2002), available at http://www.cjareports.org/reports/fnrep02.pdf [hereinafter CJA,
NON-FELONY TRENDS].
26 For informative examples of these selection
biases in action, see RONALDJ. AL,
LEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS & ELEANOR SwIFIr, EVIDENCE: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS
303 (2d ed. 1997); RICHARD 0. LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS &JAMES S. LIEBMAN, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 326-27 n.10 (3d ed. 2000).
27 See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN
A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH
TO

EVIDENCE 217 (2d ed. 1983) ("[P]olice work is organized so that persons mistakenly
charged are likely to have criminal records."); accord David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle ofEscalatingPenaltiesforRepeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 753 (2001); Chris William
Sanchirico, CharacterEvidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1271-72

(2001).

See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 217 & n.47; cf Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956,
986-87 (1999).
28
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offenses that have increasingly become the grist of criminal court
mills. 29 But even in more serious cases, police are prone to arrest recidivists on less concrete evidence, because police often start with the
recidivists-for instance, by directing crime victims to mug-shot books
composed exclusively of prior arrestees. 30 In short, when police lack
solid leads-or even when they just need higher arrest numbers-the
time has come to "round up the usual suspects," as Captain Renault
31
announced in Casablanca.
B. ChargingBiases
At the screening phase, prosecutors err on the side of charging-a
predisposition that affects all arrestees, notjust recidivists. 32 There are
two principal reasons. First, in the interest of comity, prosecutors
must level charges against a significant portion of the arrestees that
33
police process. Second, prosecutors carry a general "presumption of

29 See, e.g., STATE OF N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., CRIMINAL COURT
OF THE CITY OF N.Y.,
ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 30, 32-33 (2005), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
courts/nyc/criminal/annual-report05.pdf [hereinafter N.Y., ANNUAL REPORT]; CJA,
NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 25, at 20 fig.2; see also supra text accompanying note
11. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-MaintenancePolicing
New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998). For example, in New York City, arrests for
theft of services (turnstile hops) rose from 1693 in 1989 to 22,686 in 1998. CJA, NONFELONY TRENDS, supra note 25, at tbl.6. Arrests for all categories of trespass rose from
2596 in 1989 to 8796 in 1998. See id. at tbl.9. Most strikingly, arrests for nonfelony possession of marijuana rose from 1214 in 1989 to 32,032 in 1998. See id. at tbl.4; see also
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor MarijuanaArrests in New York City, 1989-2000, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y
165 (2007).
30 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 217; Dana, supra note
27, at 752-53;
Sanchirico, supra note 27, at 1271-72.
31 CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. Pictures 1942). I wish I could claim
this illustrative
reference as my own. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 217 n.47.
32 Many scholars have highlighted a systemic prosecutorial screening
failure. See
Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/BargainingTradeoff 55 STAN. L. REV. 29
(2002); see also Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the Acquitted,
42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1180 (2005); Schulhofer, Regulatory System, supra note 1, at
52. A noteworthy recent example of this failure is the so-called Duke Lacrosse case,
where a North Carolina prosecutor zealously pursued very questionable rape charges
against three Duke lacrosse players. See Peter Whoriskey & Sylvia Adcock, All Charges
Dropped Against 3 at Duke, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2007, at Al.
" See George F. Cole, The Decision To Prosecute, in ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES
ON LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS 123, 127 (John A. Robertson ed., 1974) ("[T]he police.., are dependent upon the prosecutor to accept the output of their system; rejection of too many cases can have serious repercussions affecting the morale, discipline,
and workload of the force."); Givelber, supra note 22, at 1362 ("Unless the police re-
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guilt" that leads them to resolve inconsistencies in favor of guilt.
This charging presumption is strongest when police arrest recidivists.
Prosecutors assume-perhaps with good reason-that recidivists are
guilty of some crime.35 As such,S prosecutors
are unlikely to exercise
36
discretion to decline prosecution.
Even in the weakest cases, prosecutors can go forward with charges and anticipate pleas because they
know that recidivists cannot easily fight charges at trial under existing
evidence rules.37
C. DismissalAversion
Once charged, innocent defendants-particularly recidivists-are
unlikely to convince prosecutors that the charges are erroneous.
Prosecutors have every incentive to spin away stories of innocence.
First, prosecutors retain the same presumption of guilt that led them
to charge erroneously in the first instance. 381 Second, even if prosecutors were receptive to protests of innocence, innocent defendants
cannot effectively signal genuine innocence because prosecutors are
aware that guilty defendants will attempt to copy any halfway persua-

port on its face reveals an inconsistency or barrier to conviction, the prosecutor accepts the general conclusion of the police without making an independent investigation or evaluation of the evidence." (quoting LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OFJUSTICE:
CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 58 (1977))); see also CJA, NON-FELONY
TRENDS, supra note 25, at 12 & tbl.1; Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, AcquittedDefendant, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1297, 1328 (2000).
34 HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 103; accord George T. Felkenes,
The Prosecutor: A
Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 98, 110-13 (1975); Givelber, supra note 32, at 1180-82;
Leipold, supra note 33, at 1328; Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 57-58 (1967).
35 ALLEN, KUHNS & SWIFT, supra note 26, at 303; accord Samuel Dash,
Cracks in the
Foundation of CriminalJustice, in ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LOWER CRIMINAL
COURTS, supra note 33, at 247, 256 ("That the man might be innocent appears not to
worry [the prosecutor] ...because [if the defendant has a] record, he must have committed some undetected crime and deserves any sentence he gets.").
36 See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying
text.
37 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 217 ("[T]he
advantage which past
crimes evidence gives the prosecutor at trial means that a weak case is less likely to be
dropped ....
");see also infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text (discussing several
conviction biases against recidivists).
See Givelber, supra note 22, at 1363 ("Having made this decision [to charge], the
prosecutor will not retreat easily from it without securing something in return, such as
a plea...."); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text. One vivid example of this
rigid thinking is prosecutorial unwillingness to concede error even in the face of exculpatory postconviction DNA evidence. Instead, prosecutors fall back on dubious alternative theories to justify ill-won convictions. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:
ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction Claims ofInnocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004).
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sive signal.3 9 In any event, in many low-stakes cases there is no time for
thorough signaling. 40 Third, prosecutors can justify incuriosity as appropriately leaving proof questions to the judge or jury. 1 Fourth, line
prosecutors often must obtain supervisory approval before dismissing
cases, 42 even though they enjoy no similar official oversight over their
bargaining, charging, and trial decisions generally. At bottom, prosecutors carry mindsets of "nondefeat"-aversions to dismissal that they
keep in all cases, but that are most pronounced in cases against recidivists."
In this sense, prosecutors consistently function as conviction
maximizers even if they only rarely operate as sentence maximizers. 45

39 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1967; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relation-

ship Between CriminalProcedureand CriminalJustice, 107 YALE LJ. 1, 40 (1997).
40 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 11 (" [T] he overwhelming majority of cases took just
a few seconds."); Lynch, supra note 1, at 126 (describing how prosecutors plea bargain
cases in "machine-gun fashion").
41 See Givelber, supra note 32, at 1181 ("[P]rosecutors may decide
that the defendant should, quite literally, 'tell it to the judge."'); see also UVILLER, supra note 5, at 19293; Skolnick, supra note 34, at 57-58.
42 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in
Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI.L. REV.
50, 64 n.42 (1968) ("[I]t [ius easier to lose the case than to go through the bureaucratic obstacles preliminary to dismissal."); see also Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the FederalSystem: An Empirical Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 24 STAN. L. REV.
1036, 1041 (1972) (noting that the Justice Department requires U.S. Attorneys to seek
approval before dismissing an indictment).
43 See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying
text.
44 See Skolnick, supra note 34, at 57 ("In the county studied, the prosecutor's
office
cared less about winning than about not losing. The norm is so intrinsic... [that it]
cannot be attributed to such a simple and obvious fact as the periodic requirement of
reelection. Indeed, reelection seemed to be taken for granted ....
");accord Stephanos
Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Tria 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2472 (2004)
("[Prosecutors'] psychology of risk aversion and loss aversion reinforces the structural
incentives to ensure good statistics and avoid risking losses."); Felkenes, supra note 34,
at 117 (analyzing prosecutors' "conviction psychology"). Notably, the conviction rate
in cases against recidivist and detained defendants (who are more likely to be recidivists) is substantially higher, which indicates a lower dismissal rate. DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 25, at 24 tbl.24; CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 25, at
tbl.16.
45 See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2471 ("The statistic
of conviction.., matters much
more than the sentence."); Felkenes, supra note 34, at 114 ("[A]n individual's success
as a prosecutor may be measured by the number of criminal convictions which he has
been able to secure."); Rabin, supra note 42, at 1045 ("[C]onvictions are the central
performance standard, and departures from the average rate raise questions and create anxieties."); id. at 1071 ("[N]egotiation of a plea, any guilty plea, is a victory; the
conviction rate is a quantitative, not a qualitative, measure of effectiveness."); Alissa
Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining,73JUDIcATURE 335, 337 (1990) ("Conviction rates constitute simplistic but easily advertised indicators of success since they appear to measure prosecutors' ability to
win cases.").
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What, then, accounts for fairly common instances of prosecutorial
dismissals? For example, in New York City, prosecutors dismiss about
a third of felonies and about a tenth of misdemeanors.46 Closer analysis of the numbers, however, reveals two trends: first, dismissals often
may have little to do with prosecutorial belief in innocence; and, second, dismissals are least likely in the low-stakes public-order cases that
innocent recidivist defendants are most likely to face.47 Specifically,
the data reveal that felonies are dismissed more frequently than nonfelonies, and violent offenses are dismissed far more frequently than
victimless offenses. 481 In fact, in New York City, nonfelony harm-topersons cases are dismissed at a rate almost ten times higher than the
rate for nonfelony drug cases. 4 9 At first blush, it seems odd that prosecutors would more readily dismiss more serious cases with concrete
victims. But that is just the point: crimes with victims generally require lay-witness cooperation and must be dismissed when cooperation is not forthcoming. Indeed, studies have found that noncooperation is the leading cause of case dismissals and decisions to not
charge. 50 Notably, in the 1990s in New York City, nonfelony charging
rates rose and pre- and postcharge dismissal rates fell even as prosecutors were called upon to process more than twice as many arrestsmost of them for public-order "victimless" offenses. 5' Prosecutors
charged more and dismissed less-even as they tackled far more
cases-because they could; they did not need lay witnesses to push
these victimless public-order cases forward (no matter how weak or
strong the cases might have been).

46 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 25, at tbl.14; N.Y.
CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AGENCY, TRENDS IN FELONY CASE PROCESSING IN THE 1990s, 28 tbl.E.2-1 (2000), available

at http://wvw.cjareports.org/reports/trends.pdf [hereinafter CJA, FELONY TRENDS]. As
noted, supra in note 25 and infra in note 126, national misdemeanor data are nonexistent. Therefore, I rely on New York City misdemeanor data for examples. These data do
not segregate prosecutorial dismissals from judicial dismissals (or even rare trial acquittals). I think it is a safe assumption, however, that prosecutors are the source of almost all
dismissals. If my assumption does not hold, the rate of prosecutorial dismissals is in fact
somewhat lower, which only serves to underscore my point further.
47 See supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
48 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 25, at tbl.15; see
also DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 25, at 24 tbls.23 & 24 (indicating that nationwide violent felonies are
dismissed approximately fifty percent more often than other felonies).
49 CJA, NON-FELONYTRENDS, supra note
25, at tbl.15.
See, e.g., HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 26-28 (1982);
Donald
A. Dripps, MiscarriagesofJustice and the Constitution, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 635, 644-46 &
nn.31-35 (1999).
51 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra
note 25, at 12 & tbls.1 & 14.
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Ultimately, it seems that prosecutors do not typically dismiss because they desire dismissal or doubt the strength of charges. There is,
therefore, no good reason to believe that innocent defendants will be
the beneficiaries of dismissals. 52 They may receive such unlikely dismissals by blind luck, but in the main they can expect only a binary
choice: plea or trial.
D. Trial Biases
Innocent recidivist defendants who choose to go to trial face
a
• , 54
number of hurdles that raise the prospect of wrongful conviction.
First, innocent defendants are less likely to rely solely on putting the
prosecution to its burden. They have stories of innocence to telltypically of alibi. But they cannot testify without potentially opening
the door to past-crimes evidence that may be used against them for
impeachment purposes. 56 In any event, juries may not credit even
true stories. 57 Second, recidivist innocent defendants are more likely

52 Cf infta notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
53 Cf Leipold, supra note 22, at 1160 ("[O]nce
the process against an innocent
suspect begins, there is little chance that a case will be derailed against the prosecutor's wishes before trial ....
"). See generally Josh Bowers, GrassrootsPlea Bargaining,91
MARQ.L. REv. 85 (2007).
54 See Gross, supra note 22, at 145-46 ("An innocent defendant
who goes to trial
faces a high risk of conviction.... [I]t is unrealistic to expect juries to systematically
correct errors in the earlier decisions to investigate, arrest, and prosecute."); see also
Givelber, supra note 32; Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains,
Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2013 (1992).
" Leipold, supra note 22, at 1130 ("It might be precisely when the wrong person
has been charged that factual development, alibis, and hard-to-find evidence are the
most vital to the case."). Innocent defendants may also include individuals who actually played some part in the alleged incident but whose behavior was noncriminal or
met an affirmative defense as a matter of law. Just like alibi defendants, these defendants have stories to tell, and they would seem even less likely to be able to tell them
persuasively. I am reminded of Clyde Griffiths, the protagonist in Theodore Dreiser
AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1925), who loses the will to murder his pregnant girlfriend,
but is convicted all the same after she accidentally drowns in his company.
56 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 27,
at 217-18.
57 See UVILLER, supra note 5, at 192 ("The stark, simple, and
ugly fact is that true
stories can be as incredible as false ones. Maybe more so since the false story is fabricated to seem true. And jurors cannot be trusted any more than the rest of us to sort
the true from the false with a high degree of accuracy."); see also Givelber, supra note
32, at 1171; Smith, supra note 1, at 513. In this respect, the plea-bargaining recidivist
defendant may feel that she played a greater role in her fate than the recidivist trial
defendant who had to sit silently by. SeeJONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 51 (1978) ("One of the peculiar differences between trial
and plea defendants is the greater propensity of those who have had trials to complain
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to be held pretrial, and this confinement impacts their ability to
communicate with their attorneys, contact witnesses, and plan defenses. 58 Third, "usual-suspects" policing creates early opportunities
for false identification. False identification is the leading cause of
wrongful arrest and conviction because police, prosecutors, and juries
give undue credence to its probative strength.59 Fourth, juries and
judges are more likely to be predisposed toward conviction of recidivist defendants6-all the more so if they can intuit, as is often manifest, that a particular defendant is currently confined. 61 For these reasons, it is no surprise that the great majority of DNA exonerations
involve recidivist defendants wrongfully convicted after trial, and that
over three-quarters of these erroneous convictions were based at least
partly on inaccurate eyewitness identification evidence. 6'

that they have not had the chance to present their side of the case.... [P]leas may foster a greater sense of participation ....").
" See Skolnick, supra note 34, at 65 ("Several studies have demonstrated that, for
the same charges, defendants who make bail generally are more successful in countering accusations of criminality than those who do not."); see also Bibas, supra note 44, at
2493; Leipold, supra note 22, at 1130.
59 On this point, see LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra
note 27, at 217; Frank H.
Easterbrook, Plea Bargainingas Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1970 (1992); Givelber,
supra note 22, at 1347-48; Gross, supra note 22, at 136; and Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Research and Legal Thought, 3 CRIME & JUST. 105, 108
(1981). Courts have long held that cases may be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a single lay eyewitness. See, e.g.,
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
6oSee, e.g., LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 218 (" [T] he jurors will not feel
great regret if they make the mistake of convicting a [recidivist] defendant innocent of
the crime charged, because they will be sure that the defendant is guilty of some
crime."); Patricia J. Williams, Reasons for Doubt, THE NATION, Dec. 30, 2002, at 10, 10
(recounting a judge's remark that "[t]he police don't have time to arrest innocent
people," and, therefore, "[i]f the defendant didn't commit this particular crime, he
did something somewhere, sometime").
61 See Skolnick, supra note 34, at 65 ("The man in jail
enters the courtroom under
guard, from the jail entrance. His hair has been cut by a jail barber, and he often
wears the clothes he was arrested in. By contrast, the 'civilian' defendant usually makes
a neat appearance, and enters the court from the spectator's [sic] seats, emerging
from the ranks of the public.").
62 See Givelber, supra note 32, at 1189; Gross, supra note 22, at 142-43.
See generally
Brandon L. Garrett, ClaimingInnocence, 92 MINN. L. REv. (forthcomingJune 2008) [hereinafter Garrett, ClaimingInnocence], available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1032408; Brandon L. Garrett, JudgingInnocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (2008). Of the first two hundred defendants exonerated by DNA evidence only nine were initially convicted after
pleas. Id. at 60. There may be several reasons for this small proportion. First, prosecutors may give fewer acceptable offers in the very high-stakes cases that ultimately lead
to DNA challenges. Id. at 74. Second, some defendants who are convicted after plea
may be barred from pursuing DNA relief, or, at a minimum, may find lawyers or courts
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These several biases present dangers of wrongful punishmentdangers traceable not to plea bargaining, but to the moments of ar63
rest, charge, or trial.
Instead, as I will explain, plea bargaining may
be the best
way for an innocent defendant to minimize wrongful pun64
ishment.

II. DEFENDANTS' PROCESS COSTS
In low-stakes cases plea bargaining is of near-categorical benefit to
innocent defendants, because the process costs of proceeding to trial
often dwarf plea prices. Defendants' process costs generally fall into
three overlapping
categories: pecuniary loss, inconvenience, and un• 65
certainty.
Postarrest, a defendant often waits twenty-four or more
hours to see ajudge. If this first appearance results in no disposition,
the judge may either set bail, remand the defendant, or release her on
her own recognizance. If the defendant is released or pays bail, she
must return to court multiple times. She faces public embarrassment,
anxiety, possible legal fees and lost wages; she is also forced to deal
with the opportunity costs of meeting with attorneys, helping prepare
defenses, and attending mandatory court appearances where little often happens. 66 For each appearance, she leaves home in the early
morning, waits in long lines to pass through courthouse security, waits
for her lawyer's arrival, waits for the prosecution to procure its file,
waits for the case to be called, waits for court personnel to serve her
with postappearance papers, and finally returns home-often in the

less receptive to challenges. See Garrett, ClaimingInnocence, supra (manuscript at 39 &
n.199) (citing statutes and case law that bar postconviction relief following guilty
pleas). Third, physical evidence may be preserved less frequently following plea convictions. Fourth, the types of innocent defendants who are disposed to forego trial
process may be similarly disposed to forego postconviction process.
63 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 320 ("If there is injustice here, the source is
not
the plea bargain. It is, rather, that innocent people may be found guilty at trial.");
Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1970 ("What disrupts this separation of the guilty from
the innocent is not a flaw in the bargaining process but a flaw at trial."); Givelber, supra
note 32, at 1175 ("The initial screening will determine significantly the kinds of errors
that are committed at the adjudicatory phase.").
64 See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 922 ("An innocent defendant
who is induced to plead guilty because he would not have been acquitted at trial could not have
been saved by the American criminal justice system."); see also Easterbrook, supra note
3, at 320.
65 See generally FEELEY, supra note 11, at 18; Martin A. Levin,
Delay in Five Criminal
Courts, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 111, 121 (1975); Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor
Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1171-72 (2004).
66 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 15, 32; Alschuler, supra
note 5, at 1192-94.
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late afternoon.67 Conversely, if she is remanded or held on bail that
she cannot pay, she remains in jail at least until disposition. Once
every few days or weeks, she is herded from jail cell to caged bus to
crowded-courthouse cell where she waits to go in shackles before a
judge for a minutes-long appearance.
For all defendants, the pretrial appearances are several; the leadup to even a misdemeanor trial may take weeks or months. 68 In contrast, pleas typically may be had immediately. 69 Significantly, these
many process costs lie independent of case strength or acquittal
chance.7 ° In fact, innocent defendants may have higher process costs
on balance than those who are guilty, because they are more likely to

67

See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 70; ARTHUR RoSE'rI & DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUS-

PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 150-51 (1976);
Weinstein, supra note 65, at 1172. Clearly, there is a difference between appropriate
and inappropriate process. Process scholars correctly condemn inapt delays and nonsensical adjournments. See, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 11, at 10, 222-24; Alschuler, supra
note 1, at 951, 955; Lynch, supra note 1, at 119. But even the most efficient trial process takes time, and process can be trimmed only so far. See FEELEY, supra note 11, at
291 ("Processing costs are part and parcel of the externalized operating costs in any
organization."); Alschuler, supra note 1, at 951 ("[S]ignificant process costs are inherent in any form of adjudication.").
6W See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 70-71 (quoting a defense attorney saying, "To
the person who wants to fight his case... they've got to come back[,] ...[b]ack and
back and back .. ");Leipold, supra note 22, at 1140 ("[A]s every practitioner knows,
there are so many exceptions to [the speedy trial] limit that [the statutorily prescribed
period] is typically just an opening bid."); Weinstein, supra note 65, at 1172
("[W]ithout any delay by the defense, it is very rare for a case to get to trial before the
fifth court date.").
69 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 69-71. In New York City, cases commence with
an arraignment appearance that occurs on average less than twenty-four hours after
arrest. N.Y., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 29. Approximately half of all cases are
disposed of at this initial arraignment appearance. Id. at 34; see also N.Y. CITY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 16 (2006) [hereinafter CJA, ANNUAL
REPORT], available at http://www.cjareports.org/reports/annual06.pdf. Even the cases
that "survive arraignments" typically do not last long-unless they proceed to trial.
One study found that 84% of convicted misdemeanor defendants were convicted
within two months of arraignments and 95% within six months. N.Y. CITY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AGENCY, QUICKVIEWS No. 3: LENGTH OF TIME TO CRIMINAL COURT DiSposiTION 2003 [hereinafter CJA, QUICKVIEWS], availableat http://www.nycja.org/research/
quick3.htm. In constrast to this speed, misdemeanor cases take an average of seven to
nine months to proceed to trial. See N.Y., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 55. Likewise, 53% of felony defendants who pled guilty did so within three months of arraignments and 89% within a year. CJA, QUICKVIEWS, supra. Yet, most felony cases that
went to trial took over one year to proceed to trial, only 10% proceeded to trial within
three months, and almost 25% went to trial only after the case was more than eighteen
months old. Id.
70 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 31 ("[P]retrial costs do not distinguish between innocent and guilty; they are borne by all ....").
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put forward positive defenses; these substantive defenses generally require more preparation time than procedural claims.71
A. ProcessPleas
In low-stakes cases, process costs dominate, and plea bargaining is
a potential way out. The innocent accused who proceeds to trial over
a plea to a pittance may advance laudable societal principles, but she
does herself few favors. 7' The costs of pleading guilty may prove so
comparatively low in minor cases that pleading becomes a reasonable
option even before assessing the real danger of trial conviction and subsequent sentence.73 Like the driver who summarily pays the undeserved traffic ticket, defendants may conclude that the fight is not
worth it, especially when they may plead guilty at arraignments, just
hours after their arrests.7 4 It is small wonder, then, that so many defendants-innocent and guilty-have little interest in engaging in
process in these cases and simply wish to "get [them] over with." 7,'
Professor Alschuler, one of bargaining's foremost critics, made
this point, noting that bargains in most misdemeanor cases are unnecessary because the process itself is sufficient to prompt process-cost
guilty pleas.7 6 Alschuler's disapproval of seemingly superfluous dis-

71

See Stuntz, supra note 39, at 40 ("Factual arguments are not merely harder to pre-

pare and pursue than legal claims; they are harder to evaluate.... In such a world, factual arguments-claims [inter alia] that the defendant did not do the crime... -tend
to require nontrivial investigation simply to establish whether there is any argument to
make.").
72 See RodneyJ. Uphoff, The CriminalDefense
Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 73, 82 (1995).
73 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 30, 277; HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 70;
Weinstein,
supra note 65, at 1172. In this respect, defendants in petty street-crime cases are
strange bedfellows of defendant corporations, for which the process may also be the
punishment: "A conviction carries at most a million-dollar fine, but simple indictment,
which lies wholly within the prosecutor's discretion, imposes multibillion-dollar losses."
Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred ProsecutionRacket, WALL ST.J., Nov. 28, 2006, at A14.
74 See supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
75 HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 69 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also id. at
69-70 ("Contrary to what the newcomer expects, defendants are often eager to plead
guilty.... [T]hey contrast the relative ease with which they can plead guilty with the
costs in time and effort required to fight a case."); Uphoff, supra note 72, at 81 ("[A]
significant number of defendants just want to plead guilty. Few criminal defendants,
even those who are innocent, actually want to go to trial." (footnote omitted)); infra
note 124 and accompanying text.
76 See Alschuler, supra note 1, at 952 ("For it is primarily the process costs of
misdemeanor justice that currently cause all but a small minority of defendants to yield to
conviction; these process costs are, in practice, more influential than plea bargain-
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counts may be sound as a critique of bargain justice generally." For
innocent defendants specifically, however, overgenerous concessions
provide escape from an undesired and expensive process on defendant-optimal terms. These innocent defendants might have pled
guilty on the basis of process costs alone, but now they may do so with
less sanction. This provides a persuasive response to the complaint
that "[f]orcing an accused to choose between immediate freedom in
return for a guilty plea and continued incarceration in return for a
claim of innocence seems perverse."78 Would we rather force the innocent defendant to remain in jail to await completion of a slow, undesired process? For innocent defendants facing a prohibitively burdensome trial course, the choice is not between bargain and potential
vindication at trial; the choice is between pleading guilty and pleading
guilty with the added discounts that plea bargaining provides. Why
should we not favor the latter-at least for the innocent?
B. Process Costs and Defendant Categories
It is worth taking a moment to specify which defendants benefit
from plea bargaining to avoid process costs. Taking the most likely
innocent defendants first-recidivists charged with minor crimestheir process costs may be tremendous, particularly when the defendants are impecunious. Courts often rely on recidivists' past records
as bases for setting more frequent and higher bail, notwithstanding
lower charge severity or even lack of case strength. 7 Furthermore, it
is doubtful whether recidivist defendants can make bail, at least in the

ing."); see also Bibas, supra note 44, at 2492-93 ("The pretrial detention can approach
or even exceed the punishment that a court would impose after trial. So even an acquittal at trial can be a hollow victory ...").
77 The discounts may be superfluous in the sense that most defendants in lowstakes cases would ultimately see fit to plead guilty even without them. Nonetheless,
such discounts save on opportunity costs. As an institutional matter, low-set bargain
prices are the most efficient means to ensure that unimportant cases plead quickly en
masse, with minimal defendant hesitation. See infta Part IV and notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
78 Givelber, supra note 1, at 1364.
See N.Y. CrIY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, FACTORS INFLUENCING RELEASE AND
BAIL DECISIONS IN NEW YORK CITY, pt. 2, at 26-28, 50 (2004), available at http://
79

www.cjareports.org/reports/bail2.pdf (Brooklyn) (discussing the importance of criminal history in bail decisions and concluding that for some judges a defendant's criminal record is "the strongest factor" in deciding whether to set bail); see also N.Y. CrHY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, FACTORS INFLUENCING RELEASE AND BAIL DECISIONS IN NEW

YORK CrtY, pL 1, at 29-43, 48 (2004), available at http://www.cjareports.org/reports/
baill.pdf (Manhattan).
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short run. For example, in New York City in 2004, only ten percent of
defendants held on bail were able to buy release at arraignment,S and
only an additional twenty-three percent were released at some later
date.81 Likewise, national studies show that most recidivist defendants
are unable to pay bail, and, as a group, they are substantially less likely
to pay bail than defendants without criminal records."' When courts
set bail, recidivist defendants are likely to remain jailed through disposition.83
The trial course is long; even if convicted, the defendant often has
already served any postconviction sentence, and then some. 84 In this
way, conviction may counterintuitively inaugurate freedom. 85 Moreover, the costs of conviction are minimal; an additional misdemeanor
conviction does little to further mar an already-soiled record because
the recidivist defendant has already suffered Smost
of the corollary
• 86
consequences that typically stem from convictions. If the defendant
can get a plea to a misdemeanor and time served, then the process
constitutes the whole punishment. 87 Any plea that frees this defendant may be more than advisable-it may be salvation. No matter how

80 CJA, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 22. Remarkably, the figure rose only to
seventeen percent even for defendants held only on minimal bail of $500 or less. Id.

81 Id. at

24.

82 See, e.g., DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 25, at 20 & tbl. 18.
83

Id.

84 See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text (noting a mean misdemeanor
jail

sentence in NewYork City of 20.1 days and a median of seven days).
85 See infra notes 125, 132-139 and accompanying text.
86 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 218; McMunigal, supra note 1, at
988; Weinstein, supra note 65, at 1171. There will, of course, be case-specific exceptions. A new convicion for a different type of crime may raise new immigration, housing, or child-custody complications. See McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A
CriminalDefense Attorney's Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strateg,, 36
U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 481-82 (2005). Additionally, new convictions may put habitualoffender, sex-offender, or persistent-misdemeanant statutes in play. Generally, however, for a defendant with ten prior misdemeanor convictions, the consequences of
receiving an eleventh are almost nonexistent. In any event, many corollary consequences are triggered by arrest, not conviction. Id. at 481; see also Leipold, supra note
33, at 1299-1300.
87 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 70-71 (quoting
a defense attorney saying,
"They'll take [time served] simply because they don't care about what the criminal record is. They have criminal records."). Additionally, a recidivist is more likely to recidivate or warrant. If she leaves a first case open, is released, and picks up a second
case, her ability to dispose of both cases on favorable terms is made more complicated.
To the extent that she fights both cases at trial, ajudge in a misdemeanor bench trial is
prone, upon conviction, to factor (at least unconsciously) the existence of the separate
open charges into the sentencing decision.
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certain of acquittal, she is better off pleading guilty.m She is the defendant who benefits most from plea bargaining, and she is the very
defendant who most frequently is innocent in fact.89
Even for the rare unjustly accused "good person," plea bargaining
may sometimes prove beneficial. Jail time is generally not a real concern when this clean-record defendant is charged with a minor crime.
Pretrial, the court usually releases the defendant on her own recognizance, and even a loss at trial would be likely to result in a nonincarceratory sentence. 90 The decision to plead guilty generally comes
down to whether the bargain results in a criminal record. Not all
types of pleas are to crimes. In many jurisdictions, a defendant may
plead down to a violation (also known as an infraction). A violation is
not a crime, and conviction for a violation leaves the defendant's
clean record intact. 9' If a defendant can get a violation offer and get
it quickly, harm is minimal. Continuing to trial would require multiple appearances, a misdemeanor trial, and the potential for a misdemeanor conviction and record (and all the debilitating corollary consequences that come with it). 92 Even assuming acquittal, the process
costs swamp the costs of a violation plea.
Even for the clean-record, innocent defendant charged with a
moderate felony, the influence of process costs may prove determinative. The court sometimes holds such a defendant pretrial.93 If the

Prosecutors may meet even demonstrable claims of innocence-for instance, in
ironclad alibi cases and in trespass cases where the defendant, in fact, lived at the location in question. This wait may be unconscionable for a detained defendant in a minor case who has the option to plead to a jail sentence shorter than the delay. In my
experience as a public defender in Bronx County, New York, the prosecutor often
would not be assigned until the case was weeks old. Even then, establishing contact
with the right prosecutor was a chore. Additionally, that prosecutor might delay for
days more while seeking supervisory approval for dismissal. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
88

89

See supra Part I.

See infra Part III.B; see aso HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 104; Scott & Stuntz, supra
note 3, at 1948.
91 See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text. A violation
may carry minor
90

penalties-fines, community service, licensing hurdles, or perhaps even a few days in
jail-but such consequences are generally slight and are familiar to anyone who has
ever received a speeding ticket (a moving violation) or a parking ticket (a parking violation).
92 See supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
93 One national study found that approximately one-third of felony
defendants
without criminal records were released without bail, and, overall, three-quarters were
released at some point pre-disposition. DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 25, at 20
tbl.18. Notably, bail decisions-especially in borderline cases-can be somewhat ca-

1138

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 156: 1117

defendant is held pretrial, she faces substantially greater process costs
than even the detained recidivist defendant in a low-stakes case, since
the pretrial wait is substantially longer for a felony trial." However,
pretrial detention is not an actual process cost when the defendant
receives a posttrial jail or prison sentence longer than the pretrial delay, because the defendant typically receives credit for pretrial jail
time. 9' Put simply, a defendant suffers no harm for serving ex ante
time that she would otherwise serve postdisposition. So, for the innocent defendant detained pretrial, the process costs of detention are
highly relevant if and only if (and to the extent that) an offer exists
that promises release in a period shorter than the pretrial interval. If
she can receive a nonincarceratory offer, the benefits of dodging detention costs may outweigh even the substantial impact of a felony
conviction and subsequent years of probation.
There is, however, a point at which the influence of process costs
melts away. The recidivist who is charged with a serious felony draws
no clear plea-bargaining advantage in terms of process costs. The
court likely will hold her on high bail or even remand. For example,
one national study found that courts set bail on or remanded over
three-quarters of all recidivist felony defendants. 96 The defendantparticularly if indigent-often remains jailed for the duration of the
case.9 7 Potential sentences are appreciable, especially if habitualoffender statutes are in play. 9 The threat of long sentences upends
process-cost considerations.( Significantly, the process costs of pretrial detention are generally nothing because the prosecutor is
pricious; studies identify marked variability between judges. See, e.g., sources cited supranote 79.
94 See CJA, FELONY TRENDS, supra note 46, at 32 tbls.E.2-5,
E.2-6; see also supra note
69 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.30(3) (McKinney 1998) ("The term of a definite
sentence... shall be credited with and diminished by the amount of time the person
spent in custody prior to the commencement of such sentence as a result of the charge
that culminated in the sentence.").
96 DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 25, at 20 tbl.18;
see also supra note 79 and
accompanying text. Overall, courts held recidivist defendants until disposition about
twice as frequently as defendants with no criminal records. DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS,
supra note 25, at 20 tbl.18. And defendants on parole were held until disposition almost three times as frequently as defendants with no criminal record. Id.
97 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying
text.
98 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 41 ("Unlike
the (misdemeanor] court, in which
'time' ... is a rarity, 'time' is what it is all about in the [felony] court.").
99 See id. at 186 n.15 ("For more serious cases, the defendant's interest is less
likely
to be summed up in terms of simply 'getting it over with.' He faces substantial prison
time, and quick disposition becomes less important. .. ").
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unlikely to offer a sentence less than the time the defendant would be
detained pretrial. Some length of postconviction detention is probably inevitable. Detention, therefore, translates into a process cost only
upon acquittal at trial. For this type of defendant, process costs are
nondeterminative and trivial. Process is not an unwelcome cost to
bear-in fact, sometimes it is all the defendant has left.100
III.

PROCESS COSTS AND LENIENCY

Process costs are not exclusive to defendants. All playersprosecutors, judges, defense attorneys-bear their own version of
these costs. Prosecutors must investigate cases, assess evidence, interview witnesses, file charges, present matters to grand juries, staff
courts, prepare motions and responses, and conduct hearings and trials. Defense attorneys investigate cases, interview witnesses and defendants, analyze defenses, make appearances, write motions, and
conduct hearings and trials. Judges and staffed courts orchestrate
these proceedings.
The traditional conception of prosecutors as sentence-maximizers
takes into account these administrative costs. Indeed, it recognizes
that efficiency (in the interest of deterrence) is the chief justification
for plea bargaining.'°1 Prosecutors craft pleas to ensure the greatest
number of convictions, with each conviction garnering the highest
possible sentence."' According to this model, most cases would naturally result in adversarial "heavy combat" but for the unfortunate reality of resource shortages.103 Plea bargaining operates in the "shadow
of trial": protracted and individualized adversarial haggling produces
results that reflect trial hazards and potential posttrial sentences.10

100 See RosETr & CRESSEY, supra note 67, at 155
("If the police are able to jail a
man before conviction for a period equal to or greater than any sentence that is likely
to be imposed, the accused might just as well plead guilty; it costs no more."); infra
notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
101 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 297.
102 See id. at 297; William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. &

ECON. 61, 63-64 (1971); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargainingand ProsecutorialDiscretion, 78 AM. EcON. REv. 713, 713-14 (1988).
103 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 267.
104 See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("To the extent
that the bargain struck reflects only the uncertainty of conviction before trial, the 'expected sentence before trial'-length of sentence discounted by probability of conviction-is the same for those who decide to plead guilty and those who hope for acquittal but risk conviction by going to trial."); accord Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1972
("Settlements are better (or worse) as the outcomes of trials are better (or worse).").
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This account depends on the engrained claim that plea bargaining necessarily exists only to prompt efficient guilty pleas so courts can
stay afloat.10 5 While it is true that courts in many urban jurisdictions
would be hard pressed to manage their dockets in a world without
plea bargaining-at least not without radically restructuring process
or a substantial infusion of resources-'much recent scholarship has
called into question the "myth" that wide-scale bargaining is a product
of heavy caseloads. 10 6 In fact, studies have found comparable rates of
plea bargaining in some low-caseload jurisdictions.1 0 7 Ultimately,
then, plea bargaining occurs for reasons other than caseload or deterrence-at least in the low-stakes cases.108
A. Workgroup Principles
What are these other reasons? Prosecutors may claim a desire to
"do the right thing" by minimizing punishment for specific defendants or by broadly relegislating what they perceive as harsh or overinclusive statutes.1 9 But prosecutors also harbor the normatively

105 See

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge

were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need
to multiply by many times the number ofjudges and court facilities."); see also UVILLER,
supra note 5, at 180-81; Givelber, supra note 1, at 1382; Skolnick, supra note 34, at 55;
Wright & Miller, supra note 32, at 30, 31 n.5.
116 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 244-77 (refuting the claim that "case pressure"
drives plea bargaining); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 32; ROSETr & CRESSEY, supra note 67, at 104-10; Peter F. Nardulli, The Caseload Controversy and the Study of Criminal Courts, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 91-93 (1979) (analyzing the work of
Feeley and Heumann).
07 See, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 11, at 244-77; Lynch, supra note 1, at 117-22.
108 See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2464 (calling the traditional model "oversimplified"); Worden, supra note 45, at 335 ("[R]esearch on prosecutors has been handicapped by overly simplified conceptions of prosecutorial motivations, such as the assumption that all prosecutors strive to maximize convictions or to impose maximally
harsh sentences .... "); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 104-05; Alschuler, supra
note 42, at 52-54; Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: StipulatingAway
ProsecutorialAccountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 966 (1997).
109Alschuler, supra note 42, at 52-54 (explaining that prosecutors
act in multiple
capacities, including that of ajudge or legislator); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at
109 (describing how a prosecutor "redefines his professional goals" in the face of statutes that "sweep too broadly" (internal quotation marks omitted)); UVILLER, supra
note 5, at 180 ("What I thought I was doing, mainly, in the run-of-the-docket case,
was.., rewriting the law, modifying the judgment of the legislature to fit the circumstances of the crime, in accord with what I perceived to be the prevailing ethic in the
courts of my time and place."); Dash, supra note 35, at 256 (discussing common-law
prosecutors who similarly circumvented death-penalty statutes); Richman, supra note
108, at 958 ("Criminal sanctions are blunt instruments .... Prosecutors thus emerge as
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more dubious motivation to avoid process and work, where possible.1 0
This is a potential factor in almost all cases, but proves most influential in minor cases in lower criminal courts where caseloads are higher
but stakes are lower. Prosecutors are loath to devote time, resources,
and full process to such "Mickey Mouse" cases.' Instead, prosecutors
may come to see arrests as valuable in and of themselves-particularly
for crimes like marijuana possession or turnstile hopping, but even for
crimes with concrete victims where
the problematic confrontation has
2
resolved itself through arrest."
In a narrow sense only, caseload may drive plea bargaining:
"[T] here will always be too many cases for many of the participants in
the system, since most of them have a strong interest in being some
place other than in court."" 3 Plea bargaining allows the workgroup to
minimize its collective workload and provides "solutions" to a com-4
mon problem: the immutable burden that is the process itself.''
Prosecutors may still care deeply about convictions," 5 but they want to
reach convictions by immediate disposition."' They care little, if at
all, about maximizing plea prices and ultimate sentence length. " '
mediators between phenomenally broad legislative pronouncements and the equities
of individual cases... " (footnote omitted)).
110 See generally FEELEY, supra note 11, at 272; HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 103, 15657; UVILLER, supra note 5, at 180; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 52-53, 106-07; Bibas, supra
note 44, at 2470; Dash, supra note 35, at 256; Lynch, supra note 1, at 121; Rabin, supra
note 42, at 1071; Zacharias, supranote 1, at 1136, 1142, 1161-63, 1181.
III See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 38 (quoting a prosecutor).
2 See CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 25, at 1; Lynch, supra note 1, at 121;
Weinstein, supra note 65, at 1170-71.
113 SeeFEELEY, supra note 11, at 272; see also Levin, supra note 65, at 125.
114 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 28-33, 159, 244 (describing the development of "informal dispositional practices, lenient sentences, and a general spirit of cooperation
among supposedly adversarial agents"); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 62-63, 8284; ROSETr & CRESSEY, supra note 67, at 105; Lynch, supra note 1, at 122-25; Skolnick,
supra note 34, at 53, 58-59.
115 See supra notes 44-45, infra notes 160-161, and accompanying
text (discussing
prosecutors' motivation to maximize convictions).
16 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 103 ("The
central concern with these nonserious cases is to dispose of them quickly. If the defense attorney requests some sort of
no-time disposition ... the prosecutor... [is] likely to agree. [There is] no incentive
to refuse .... The case is simply not worth the effort to press for greater penalty.");
Bibas, supra note 44, at 2471-72 ("The statistic of conviction.., matters much more
than the sentence.... Thus, prosecutors may prefer the certainty of plea bargains even
if the resulting sentence is much lighter than it would have been after trial."); Dash,
supra note 35, at 256 (describing the "fervent desire of the prosecutors to establish a
record of numerous convictions the quickest and easiest way").
17 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 71-72 ("The
newcomer is struck by the prosecutor's eagerness to enter into a deal that seems beneficial to the defendant."); ROSETr &
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Many opponents of plea bargaining complain of the coercion implicit in pleas that are supposedly too good to turn down. 11 8 But few
critics inquire as to why so many pleas are far too good to turn down.
Prosecutors are well positioned to take advantage of defendants. Specifically, prosecutors could readily try to extract high-price pleas from
confined defendants by leveraging the costs of pretrial detention.
(For example, a jailed defendant facing misdemeanor charges might
rationally accept any plea offer that promises a sentence even marginally shorter than pretrial delay.) However, these are the very cases
where prosecutors most strongly wish to act for reasons other than
sentence maximization, in addition to being the cases where prosecutors can most easily act on these other motivations. First, prosecutors
are subject to little public or official oversight in such cases.119 Second, as previously noted, prosecutors can rationalize leniency as ethically appropriate in many low-stakes cases. 120
If society might be
served by less significant penalties, prosecutors can entertain their desires for work avoidance while credibly claiming to "render substantive
justice," which may just be a convenient excuse for leniency and
speedy case processing. ' In short, the very cases where prosecutors
can make the most of defendants' high process costs are the cases
where prosecutors are least likely to do so. 2 The anomaly is that de-

CRESSEY, supra note 67, at 107 ("[Prosecutors] routinely grant so-called concessions to

many... knowing full well that the attorney will not take up their time with a trial if
they do not."); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2553-54 (2004) ("[P]rosecutors do not try to maximize total prison time.... [T]he legally authorized sentence is harsher than the sentence prosecutors want to impose."); see also infra notes 127-139 and accompanying text
(providing data demonstrating leniency).
n8 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 42, at 60; Langbein, supra note 3, at 12; Lynch,
supra note 1, at 123; Schulhofer, Disaster,supra note 1, at 2004-05; see also infra note 184
and accompanying text, and Part VI.
119 See infra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
:20 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
,21FEELEY, supra note 11, at 25; accord HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 84-85 (describing bargains as "reasonable at worst, and extremely favorable at best"); Alschuler, supra
note 42, at 106-07 (noting that political considerations can lead to lenient sentences);
Dash, supra note 35, at 256 (noting other prosecutorial motivations for leniency, but
concluding that the "major" reason is "the desire of the prosecutor for a record of
numerous convictions by the quickest and easiest method"). See generally Schulhofer,
Disaster,supra note 1, at 1988 (discussing agency concerns driving prosecutors to make
"unduly lenient sentence offers" that maximize neither deterrence nor the public interest); Schulhofer, Regulatory System, supra note 1, at 50-52, 63-66 (same).
See Lynch, supra note 1, at 123 ("As loyal members of the workgroup team,
prosecutors did not take advantage of the [defendants'] predicament.., but instead
consistently offered a carrot .... They knew that they, too, would lose professional face
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fendants enjoy great discounts in cases where process costs alone
23
might have led them to plead guilty without any discounts at all.1
114
Where process hurts most, bargain justice helps all parties most.
Consequently, prosecutors make frequent offers of pleas to noncriminal violations and time-served dispositions. 125
B. Lenient Pricing

Admittedly, it is difficult to demonstrate conclusively that prosecutors make lenient plea offers in low-stakes cases. Indeed, I necessarily
limit my analysis to data from New York City's enforcement of nonfelony criminal cases, because I could uncover no comprehensive misdemeanor data from otherjurisdictions.16 That caveat aside, I believe
my leniency claim is somewhat generalizable. Indeed, various scholars

were they to force trials by not offering generous deals."); see also Scott & Stuntz, supra
note 3, at 1948 n.131 ("[T]he prosecutor's incentive to 'push' such cases is slight since
the post-trial punishment will be so low."); infra notes 132-139 and accompanying text
(describing the short sentences given for misdemeanors when statutory sentences are
longer); cf Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality ofBargainingPower, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139,
171 (2005) ("[T]he mere fact that a [bargaining] party has the potential to use... [a]
source[] of power does not require that the party actually use that power.").
123 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
124 This partially explains studies that find defendant satisfaction with plea bargaining. See, e.g., CASPER, supra note 57, at 48-49 tbl.VIII-5; see also supra note 75 and
accompanying text (discussing defendants' preference to "get it over with" (quoting
HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted))). Casper's wellknown study of defendant attitudes found that 64% of defendants who pled guilty believed they were treated fairly, compared to only 41% of defendants who were tried.
CASPER, supra note 57, at 48 tbl.VIII-5. Remarkably, this 64% satisfaction rate was just
shy of the 69% rate for defendants who had their cases dismissed outright. Id. The
plea-bargaining mill may seem nasty and brutish, but defendants favor it because the
attendant sentences are short. Cf FEELEY, supra note 11, at 29-30 ("If we looked only at
jails, with their ubiquitous overcrowding, the criminal justice system might appear to
be unduly harsh and severe. But if we sat in the gallery in a lower criminal court, the
process might appear chaotic and arbitrary, but essentially tolerant and lenient.").
15 Indeed, observers have noted the frequent
paradox that defendants held pretrial are released only upon conviction by plea. See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 3, 30, 139;
Givelber, supra note 1, at 1364-65; McMunigal, supra note 1, at 990; James Mills, "I Have
Nothing
with Justice,"LIFE MAG., Mar. 12, 1971, at 61-62.
126 To Do..
Cf Michael J. Leiber & Anita N. Blowers, Race and Misdemeanor Sentencing, 14
CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REv. 464, 469 (2003) ('Only a few comprehensive studies of misdemeanor sentence outcomes exist."); Ed A. Mufioz & Stephen J. Sapp, Racial/Ethnic
Misdemeanor Sentencing Disparities: Additional Evidence for Contextual Discrimination, I J.
ETHNICTY CRIM. JUST. 27, 29 (2003) ("The deficiency in knowledge surrounding the
adjudication of misdemeanor crimes is somewhat surprising considering they are the
most common types of offenses for which people are detained, interrogated, arrested
and convicted ....
").
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have observed widespread leniency in other jurisdictions. 2 7 In any
event, even if leniency exists only for trivial public-order offenses in
northern urban jurisdictions, then that leniency would still affect a
sizable defendant population-the majority of criminal defendants in
many of the nation's largest cities.
Looking at New York City specifically, the data show somewhat
clear leniency. In 1998, fifty-two percent of all misdemeanor charges
that ended in conviction were reduced to pleas to noncriminal violations. 2 8 For clean-record defendants, the rate of reduction was eightysix percent. 129 Even for the worst recidivists--defendants with both
prior felony and misdemeanor convictions-the rate of reduction remained over twenty-five percent.130
Likewise, over fifty percent of all misdemeanor charges that ended
in conviction resulted in nonjail dispositions.13 1 Of the so-called jail
sentences, fifty-seven percent were sentences of time served. 132 Even
for defendants with combined felony and misdemeanor records, the
rate of time-served sentences dropped only to near fifty percent.133
Further, the percentage of express time-served sentences significantly
underestimates the number of sentences that were in fact equivalent to
time served, because most defendants with designated time sentences
actually had completed those sentences at disposition. The mean sentence was only twenty days and the median was seven days for misdemeanor defendants sentenced to designated jail terms-notwithstanding potential statutory sentences of up to one year for A-level misde-

127 See, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 11, at 28-32 (urban Connecticut); HEUMANN,
supra
note 11, at 10-11, 81-85 (urban and rural Connecticut); ROSETr & CRESSEY, supra note
67, at 45-46 (Los Angeles county); Dash, supra note 35, at 253-54 (Chicago); Lynch,
supranote 1, at 117-22 (rural and suburban NewYork counties); Uphoff, supra note 72,
at 89 n.63 (Oklahoma); Donald I. Warren,Justice in Recorder's Court: An Analysis of Misdemeanor Cases in Detroit, in ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTrvES ON LOWER CRIMINAL
COURTS, supranote 33, at 326, 334 (Detroit).
128 See CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 25,
at tbl. I7A (calculating the average
rates for A- and B-level misdemeanors).
'2

130

Id. at tbl.18.

Id.
Id. at 29.
132 Id. at 29 & tbl.19. For clean-record defendants this
57% rate rose to 76.3%. Id.
at tbl.19.
133 See id. (noting that 51.5% received postconviction jail sentences); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 81 (quoting a defense attorney saying, "I am... I tell you,
amazed... by how few people go to jail. I mean, we get some pretty bad clients, and
they don't go to jail." (first ellipsis in original)).
131
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meanors and ninety days for B-level misdemeanors. 14 Moreover, under New York law, defendants serve only two-thirds of their sentenced
jail time, calculated from the moment of arrest."s For example, the
defendant with a median seven-day sentence must serve only four days
(rounding, as the system does, in the defendant's favor).3 6 As such,
many-if not most-of these supposed jail time sentences were in fact
fully satisfied at the time of plea. 1 7 Only a fraction of misdemeanor
defendants had to serve any postpleajail time at all.'38 Put differently,
many of these defendants were
jailed as part of the process and re39
bargain.
the
of
part
as
leased

34
135

CJA, NON-FELONYTRENDS, supra note 25, at tbl.20.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(3) (McKinney 1998).

136

Id.

137

See CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 25, at 29 & tbls.19-20; see also Freda F.

Solomon, N.Y. Criminal Justice Agency, The Impact of Quality-of-Life Policing, CJA RES.
BRIEF, Aug. 2003, at 1, 6, available at http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief3.pdf
(noting that this data set "includes jail sentences satisfied by pre-trial detention time").
Even for the defendant who had not yet completed the median sentence, the shortest
adjournment would likely be days longer than the median sentence (and, of course, a
trial would require many adjournments). See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
13 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 25,
at 29 & tbl.19; cf. HEUMANN, supra
note 11, at 187 n.17.
139 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 30 ("For every defendant sentenced to a jail term
of any length, there are likely to be several others who were released from jail only after
and because they pleaded guilty."); Bibas, supra note 44, at 2493 ("IT] he shadow of pretrial detention looms much larger over these small cases than does the shadow of
trial."); Givelber, supra note 1, at 1364 ("The road to freedom is a guilty plea, whereas
insisting upon innocence means that incarceration continues."); Weinstein, supra note
65, at 1171 ("If a defendant is denied bail [at arraignment], she will likely spend more
time waiting for the case to be resolved than would have been imposed in a jail
term."). Even in more serious cases, prosecutors may offer lenient sentences. Notably,
in New York City in the 1990s, only 57% of felony defendants received any kind ofjail
or prison sentence. CJA, FELONY TRENDS, supra note 46, at 34 tbl.F.l; cf HEUMANN,
supra note 11, 187-88 n.17 (noting that only 48.8% of defendants in a study of upper
criminal court received jail or prison time). Of the defendants sentenced to jail or
prison, almost one-third received sentences that amounted to time served, only 2.4%
were sentenced to over five years in prison, and over 70% were sentenced to city jail
time of one year or less. CJA, FELONY TRENDS, supra note 46, at 35-38 & tbl.F.3. Perhaps more significantly, almost two-thirds of all felony cases were reduced and disposed
of in lower criminal courts as misdemeanors, violations, or dismissals; an additional
number of felony cases were disposed of as misdemeanors and violations in the upper
felony courts. Id. at 27 tbI.E.1, 31 tbl.E.24; cf Dash, supra note 35, at 253-54 (noting
similar findings in a Chicago felony court).
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C. Fixed Pricing
Lenient sentencing in a collection of cases begets lenient prices
more broadly. Bargains are struck according to "going rates"-known
and somewhat fixed starting-point prices.14 These prices may vary
over time as customary practices change, but, at a given moment, the
going price for a certain charge against a defendant with a certain
type of record is largely market set and unreflective of statutory prescription.14 As such, the analogy of the plea-bargain regime to a trading bazaar is misplaced. 1 2 The regime is more akin to a supermarket
or department store. Repeat players routinely process similar cases
according to intuitively known, market-set prices that are discernible
upon quick reference to defendants' past records and the present
charges. From a set starting point, a prosecutor may adjust prices by
largely set increments based on information that is either manifest
143
from the record or can be succinctly conveyed to that prosecutor.
Moreover, because pricing at the outset is not static or individualized,
when a collection of prosecutors make lenient offers for a given type
of charge, this leniency serves as "precedent" for future pricing for
that charge. 1" This is true whether prosecutors were motivated in

140 See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of CriminalJustice, 66 FORDHAM
L.
REV. 2117, 2130 (1998) ("Many, perhaps most, cases are processed pursuant to fairly
standard rules .... The rules are more like those of the supermarket than those of the
flea market: there is a fixed price tag on the case .... "); see also FEELEY, supra note 11,
at 158-59 (describing how repeat players know the worth of a case "intuitively"); HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 188 n.19 ("[A] 'feel for a case' develops with greater experience in the system.... [T]he defense attorney's 'feel' is often not very different from
that of the experienced prosecutor."); DONALDJ. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 79 (1966) ("Common patterns of
charge reduction or sentence promise emerge wherever the practice is frequent.");
Bibas, supra note 44, at 2481 ("[Rlepeat players... develop a feel for cases and can
gauge the going rate for particular types of crimes and defendants."); Scott & Stuntz,
supra note 3, at 1923 ("[T]he bargaining range is likely to be both small and familiar to
the parties, as both prosecutors and defense attorneys have a great deal of information
about customary practices ... [and] the 'market price' for any particular case.").
See UVILLER, supra note 5, at 179 (noting that the "worth" of a crime in the "ordinary commerce of the courts" is less than the punishments prescribed by statute (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1923, 1933;
infra notes 199-202.
142 See UVILLER, supra note 5, at 177-78 (introducing that and other similar analogies).
143 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1922-23.
144See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 120-21 ("After obtaining a specific
plea bar-

gain .... [defense attorneys] treat this disposition as a 'precedent' .... Prosecutors, in
turn, admit that they are subject to these 'habits of disposition' .... Thus, a good defense deal in one case can have a trickle-down effect.... .").
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past cases by substantive justice
principles, workgroup principles, or
45
something else altogether.
The pervasiveness of fixed pricing is a counterpoint to the common objection that defense attorneys
who consistently avoid trials
!,•
•
146
cannot credibly threaten litigation.
Prosecutors may extend marginally worse offers to defense lawyers who are recognized as frequent
pleaders. But, in the main, a particular lawyer's shortcomings are cor47
rected by market prices that derive from aggregate defender work.1
D. JudicialInput
Judges play a secondary role in the plea-bargaining process, 1 " but
their presence is nevertheless felt, especially as a check on bargains
that are set outside the prevailing market.' 49 Like prosecutors and defense attorneys, judges wish to avoid the administrative costs of entertaining litigation-particularly in low-stakes cases.' 50 Generally, their
first priority is to oversee expeditious case processing-usually by
plea.151 Judges typically have few objections to lenient dispositions on
"garbage[,] ... cheap cases."'' 52 They are more likely to object when
prices are too high rather than too low, because high prices more readily engender defendant resistance and serve as obstacles to efficient
guilty pleas. 153 Consequently, in low-stakes cases, judges rarely inter145 Cf id. at 161 (quoting a prosecutor saying, "[W]e try
to avoid stupid recommendations, but we do make mistakes sometimes, and they have these aftereffects.").
146 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1186-87 (describing how a defense attorney's

reputation for avoiding trial can lead prosectors to withhold leniency); Bibas, supra
note 44, at 2478.
:47 See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1933-34.
48 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 102 (noting that while
judges have much formal power over sentencing, they actually exercise little of it); UVILLER, supra note 5, at
179, 186; Wright & Miller, supra note 32, at 39.
149See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1959 ("The judge is in a poor position to
supervise the bargaining process, but he is in a very good position to recognize unusually
high sentences."); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 127-52 (describing the judge's
role in plea barganing).
150 See FEELEY, supranote 11, at 271; HEUMANN, supranote 11,
at 127-52; Levin, supra
note 65, at 90-91; Skolnick, supra note 34, at 55; Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2560-61.
151I practiced in front of one judge who used the same question
to open every
case he deemed disposable by plea bargain: "What's the disposition?"
152 Levin, supra note 65, at 95, 122 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153 See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 105 (discussing judges'
preferences for reasonable recommenations from prosecutors); Lynch, supra note 1, at 120 (describing the
often harsh practices of particular judges, aimed at forcing defendants to plead guilty
rather than go to trial); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1959 ("The judge... is in a
very good position to recognize unusually high sentences."); Skolnick, supra note 34, at
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1 4
cede to derail even seemingly overlenient time-served pleas. 5 This
55
"going rates."'
top-down judicial pressure further fosters ex ante low

IV. BARGAINING IN LOW-STAKES CASES
6
UnAgency failure is a prominent plea-bargaining concern.
doubtedly, some level of bilateral agency failure does exist. As Judge
57
Easterbrook correctly noted, "Of what agents is this not true?" ' But
even beyond this truism, there are strong reasons to believe that the
critics' great concern for defendant-principals is misplaced-at least
when it comes to bargaining in low-stakes cases. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, imperfect agency in low-stakes cases does little to interfere with defendant-optimal plea pricing and may in fact encourage it,
because defense attorneys and prosecutors can best prioritize their

own work avoidance by setting and keeping plea prices low.
A. Oversight
Prosecutors are supposedly subject to public and official oversight,
but these restraints are highly attenuated-if they exist at all-in low-

55 (explaining that judges are often unhappy with prosecutors who overcharge and
dissuade plea bargains); Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2561 ("[J]udges, like prosecutors
and defense attorneys, are invested in plea bargaining and try to facilitate it.").
154See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 130; HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 188 n.17 (offering quantitative support for the proposition that judges almost always concur with a
prosecutor's sentence recommendation in low-stakes cases); Skolnick, supra note 34, at
62 ("Since the judge is also under administrative pressure, he rarely rejects a plea of
guilty, and also rarely fails to cooperate with the defense attorney and prosecutor who
have worked out a 'deal."'); Wright & Miller, supra note 32, at 39-40 ("The judge...
has little incentive to inquire behind the parties' agreement.").
155 See supra Part III.C.

156 See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1181-1210; Bibas, supra note 44,
at 2477; Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: OrganizationalCooptation of a
Profession, 1 LAW & SOCY REV. 15, 28 (1967) (describing the defense attorney as a
"[d]ouble [a]gent"); F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargainingand
Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor,the Defense Counsel, and theJudge, 16 BYU
J. PUB. L. 189, 207-11 (2002); Lynch, supra note 1, at 122-25;John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the CriminalDefense Attorney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293,
319-21 (1980).
157 See Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1975 ("Agency costs
are endemic and do not
justify abandoning consensual transactions."); see also ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL
MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 206, at 346 (5th ed. 1988) ("[T]he
negotiated disposition of criminal charges is no more to be scorned [because of various corruptions in some cases] than are all contracts because some of them are fraudulent.").
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stakes cases.'" s Prosecutors can shirk their duties with relative impunity. Even when publicly elected district attorneys adopt tough-oncrime postures, their assistants can covertly circumvent restrictive
policies. 59 And it is rational for district attorneys seeking reelection to
permit-or even privately encourage-bargaining for suboptimal sentences, because opposing candidates gain little foothold by spotlighting
minor sanctions in minor cases but could make more headway drawing
attention to suboptimal conviction rates. The conviction rate, after all,
is the most visible rubric of quality job performance.' 6° And that
measure is achieved most readily by lenient, quick bargains. 16'
Defense attorneys enjoy no similar freedom from oversight. Instead, defendants check defense attorneys-however imperfectly. Defense attorneys must sell offers to their clients, and defendants always
operate as sentence minimizers.162 Critics point to the pressures on63
defendants to plead guilty, and these pressures are no doubt real.1
But defendants remain the most immediate check on whether pleas
will be consummated-certainly more immediate than public and supervisory oversight of line prosecutors. Consequently, defense attorneys
d may find it difficult to convince defendants to accept harsh
deals.
Time-served pleas or the equivalent are so prevalent because
bargains that require jail time are more likely to prompt defendants to
balk.165 And this is all the more true for recidivist defendants, who are
better positioned to identify atypically high plea prices and to use earlier dispositions as benchmarks for what constitute suitable pleas in
pending cases.
,164

158 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 169 (noting
that in all but high-stakes cases "a
'zone of indifference' surrounds court practices" such that "the community is indifferent to how and why cases are plea bargained or tried"); Bibas, supra note 44, at 2476;
Levin, supra note 65, at 93; Lynch, supra note 1, at 125.
159 See ROSEMr & CRESSEY, supra note 67, at 106
(noting that prosecutors undercut
the projected image that they "are interested only in maximizing punishment"); see also
Schulhofer, Regulatory System, supra note 1, at 50-51, 64; Worden, supra note 45, at 338.
160 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

161 See supra note

116.

c,2 See Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2554.
163

See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 81; Lynch, supra note 1, at 132; Schulhofer,

Regulatory System, supra note 1, at 74; Schulhofer, Disaster,supra note 1, at 1992.
16 See HEUMANN, supra note U1, at 82 (quoting
a defense attorney saying,

"[I]f I
use the wrong word... [it] may get them scared .... "); Lynch, supra note 1, at 123
(describing difficulties convincing clients to accept plea bargains); Skolnick, supra note
34, at 66 (describing a defense attorney's need to appease his client).
165 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 42 ("[1]f you are
talking time, negotiations become strained." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Significantly, public defenders represent most criminal defendants, and these lawyers are more likely to engender clients' visceral
mistrust (however undeserved).16' Their clients may require substantially greater concessions to overcome engrained worries of selfdealing. To keep defendants from exercising-even temporarilytheir option to reject pleas, it makes sense for self-interested prosecutors and defense attorneys to set lenient bargain prices ex ante. Institutional prices remain low going forward-lower than is even necessary to make the pleas rational-because these prices are most likely
161
to allow both sides to finish their work quickly and go home early.
Moreover, although defendants provide some check over poor
bargaining results, they cannot so readily check poor trial practice. 6
Consequently, defendants with bad lawyers are generally better off after
plea bargaining. Defense attorneys who favor work avoidance over
their clients' best interests are more likely to hurt their clients at
trial.169 Plea bargaining is a skill, but it does not involve the technical
expertise or the time outlay required for trial preparation and defense. "° The point is particularly salient for innocent defendants, because their cases more likely require heavier investigation and presentation of positive trial defenses. 7 ' The indolent lawyer may perform
worst when telling a client's story of innocence. Conversely, that law166

See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2486 ("Indigent defendants may distrust public de-

fenders' recommendations to cooperate because they already fear that their free lawyers are pushing pleas to get rid of cases."); Lynch, supra note 1, at 121 (describing defendants' perception of public defenders as "hired cronies of the state"); Skolnick,
supra note 34, at 67 (noting that indigent defendants "tend to be more critical and
hostile toward their attorney from the start of the case"); see also United States v. Hill,
252 F.3d 919, 925-26 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting a defendant saying, "I want him off my
case.... I don't trust him .... He's got too many people he's helping out. So, I prefer
he helped them out.").
167 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 272; HEUMANN,
supra note 11, at 72 (quoting a defense attorney saying, "Usually we get very good first-offer-deals from the prosecutors.").
168 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1922, 1933-34; cf CASPER, supra note 57, at
49-51.
169 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 309 (arguing
that imperfect agency is present at all stages of criminal procedure, not just bargaining).
170 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 78 (quoting a defense attorney saying, "[L]ike

making love, you do it enough times, you learn to like it, and you'll get good at it.");
Lynch, supra note 1, at 131 ("I am convinced that the average car salesman or real estate agent with a few days of instruction could become an adequate plea bargainer.");
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1928, 1933 (suggesting that conducting a trial is more
difficult than negotiating a plea bargain).
171 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1934 ("[A] world without plea
bargaining
would disproportionately harm both the innocent and the poor .. ");supranote 71 and
accompanying text
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yer's negotiation failures are constrained to a degree by the defendant
herself, by customary market pricing, and by judicial pressure to correct atypically high prices. 112 Finally, the lazy lawyer has an increased
incentive to diligently pursue plea negotiations, because the relatively
small investment in reaching a defendant-optimal plea price maximizes chances that the lawyer will not have to invest heavily in repeat
appearances, or, worse still, trial work.113
B. Bluffing
When it comes time for bluffing, the defense attorney has an advantage over the prosecutor: the defendant has a "call" on the prosecutor's time.174 The defense attorney can make his bluff more credible by insisting that the defendant fully intends to exercise her call, no
matter how foolish that exercise may be. This bluffing advantage may
carry even more weight when the defendant asserts innocence, because the defense attorney can point to the innocence claim as the
reason the defendant refuses to come around. 75 Defendants and
their counsel have room to push back, and prosecutors are unlikely to
stand firm. 116 In the end, prosecutors must try cases if defendants re' See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1933.
173See id. at 1928,

1933.
Id. at 1924 ("The defendant's [trial] entitlement thus motivates
prosecutors to
bargain-notsimply to make offers and walk away.").
175 Innocence claims may lead prosecutors to lower prices, but they are unlikely
to
convince prosecutors to dismiss cases. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that prosecutors resist innocence signals). At best, prosecutors may consider a
credible innocence pitch as one more summary factor-together with criminal record
and severity of charges-in the quick processing of pleas.
Professors Scott and Stuntz worried that innocent defendants were at greatest peril
of acquiescing to unfavorable pleas, because the innocent are more risk averse than
the criminally inclined. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1943. But, to my thinking, the
risk-aversion point holds true only for clean-record innocent defendants-the less frequent type. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that clean-record innocent defendants may be less likely to take pleas, because they may (1) be more reluctant to accept an initial criminal conviction that carries greater corollary consequences than
subsequent convictions, (2) overestimate their chances of acquittal, (3) elect to try
cases on principle even in the face of lenient pleas, or (4) have greater ability to fight
cases at trial. See ALLEN, KuHNs & SWIFr, supra note 26, at 303; LEMPERT & SALTZBURG,
supra note 27, at 217 & n.45; Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1970; Landes, supra note
102, at 69; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 894, 924; McMunigal, supra note 1, at 987.
176 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 71-72, 188 n.18; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 5657 (quoting San Francisco's chief ADA saying, "Defense attorneys use the fact that we
have to move the unimportant cases as quickly as possible-it's an effective way of doing their job."); McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 895 ("The greater the defendant's desire for trial, the greater the sentencing disparity must be in order to induce a guilty
174

1152

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 156:1117

fuse to plead. The best defense tool in the face of an atypically high
price then--or even just a price that the defendant does not particularly like-is to create the perception that the defendant is willing to
177
engage her own process costs.
Of course, a defendant and her attorney can only use litigation to

better her bargaining position at the price of bearing process costs.
For many, the best plea is a quick one. In every courthouse, however,
there are "gamblers"--defense attorneys and defendants who buck
the general trend toward cooperation and fight on for the love or
principle of the fight.178 When these defense attorneys drive hard bargains, it not only lowers prices in these particular cases but generally
pressures prices downward going forward."")
C. Case Weakness
Above all, prosecutors want to obtain some kind of conviction and
to avoid wholesale dismissal or acquittal. 8 0 For weak cases, this "conviction 181psychology" translates into marked added bargaining dis-

counts.
As one prosecutor explained to Professor Alschuler:
"When we have a weak case.., we'll reduce to almost anything rather
than lose."'"" These discounts supplement typical low-set prices to

plea."); see also UVILLER, supra note 5, at 181 ("Prosecutors generally feel they owe
some deference to the interests ofjudicial economy."); Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea
Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REv. 695, 713 (2001) (discussing the impact of prosecutors'
heavy caseloads); Levin, supra note 65, at 120-21 (same).
177 Cf Barnhizer, supra note 122, at 179 (noting that one
way to overcome an adversary's superior bargaining power is "to be indifferent to its threats" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178 See Skolnick, supra note 34, at 66 (describing
defendants who refuse to take a
plea); cf Bibas, supra note 44, at 2479 (" [I] nexperienced lawyers will be too unyielding
in plea bargaining because they want trial experience.").
179 See UVILLER supra note 5, at 181 (noting that if defenders refuse to plead
clients
to offered dispositions "they can drive down the market... [, and that this] background prospect helps to keep offers at the low end"); supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
10o See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
10 Felkenes, supra note 34, at 117; accord HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 106; A]schuler, supra note 42, at 59; Bibas, supra note 44, at 2472-73; Lynch, supra note 1, at
132; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 895-96; McMunigal, supra note 1, at 990.
2 See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Bibas, supra note 44, at 2473 (noting the potential for "irresistible offers in weak
cases"); Dash, supra note 35, at 256; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1942 (noting that
prosecutors will be more generous with defendants they think would be more difficult
to convict at trial); Uphoff, supra note 72, at 88-89 ("Prosecutors are well aware of the
allure of a 'no jail' recommendation and use it frequently to entice a defendant into a
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make already-lenient market offers even more irresistible-at least in
low-stakes cases where process costs loom largest. And these caseweakness discounts are of particular relevance to innocent defendants, because the innocent are more likely to face flimsy charges. S"
Critics emphasize this last point as the precise problem: normatively, defendants facing weak charges should go to trial because they
are likely to be acquitted, but the propensity of this group to plead
guiltyfu to 184
cheap pleas undermines the system's central truth-seeking
function.
This objection carries obvious weight from a systemic
standpoint, but for the innocent defendant in the low-stakes case who
must endure a process more painful than the proffered plea, the
prospect of eventual acquittal is of small consolation. Instead, many
innocent defendants are quite happy for the opportunity to give the
prosecution a conviction-however undeserved-if they may avoid the
daunting process and the potential disaster of full trial loss.1S5
"

V. WHERE PROCESS COSTS MATTER LITTLE:
TRIAL PENALTIES VERSUS PLEA REWARDS

In serious cases, prosecutors drive harder bargains and aim for
sentence maximization to a greater degree.'86 They are less willing

guilty plea in a marginal case .... "). One study asked prosecutors which of a number
of factors might lead them to plea bargain. Case weakness was the only factor to which
all prosecutors answered affirmatively. See Dominick R. Vetri, Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by ProsecutorsTo Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 app. at 901
(1964).
183 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 42, at 60; Landes, supra
note 102, at 69; Scott &
Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1942. For example, one-witness identification cases are the presumed sources of both the greatest number of false convictions and some of the most
pronounced case-weakness discounts. See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 63 ("Almost
without exception, prosecutors list this case as one in which unusual concessions will
be gven."); supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 64 ("If trials ever serve a purpose, their
utility is
presumably greatest when the outcome is in doubt. The practice of responding to a
weak case by offering extraordinary concessions therefore represents, at best, a dangerous allocation of institutional responsibility."); Lynch, supra note 1, at 132; McMunigal, supra note 1, at 990; Vetri, supra note 182, at 901.
185 Cf CASPER, supra note 57, at 49-50 (discussing
defendant satisfaction with plea
bargaining); Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1975 ("Black markets are better than no
markets.... Rights that may be sold are more valuable than rights that must be consumed .... "); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1933 ("The relative losers in a nobargaining world have no control over their fate; other forces-prosecutorial charging
decisions, trial error rates-determine whether they fare well or poorly.").
186 See Rabin, supra note 42, at 1072 (discussing
cases in which U.S. Attorneys are
unwilling to bargain); Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2563 ("With respect to the most vio-
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and able to provide categorically lenient deals. First, there is more
public and managerial oversight of these high-profile cases. 187 Second, prosecutors are more likely to try even weak cases because they
cannot justify the substantial discounts that make these cases imprudent for defendants to litigate.' 8s Third, defense attorneys cannot
bluff effectively because prosecutors are more ready to call and try
cases.' 9 Particularly when the charges are grave and the defendant
has a serious record, prosecutors concede only enough to make pleas
just rational, and in certain cases they offer no discounts at all.190 In
fact, even when bargaining may be justified, prosecutors may favor
trial: victory in a high-profile case may polish a reputation. 191
Concurrently, defendants' process costs diminish in importance.
Pretrial detention is no process cost at all where the defendant will receive a sentence after either trial or plea that exceeds and consumes
the term of preconviction confinement. 19 And all other process costs
pale in comparison to lengthy postconviction sentences. As stakes
rise, therefore, defendants become more forward looking; potential
93
future consequences take precedent over any focus on present pain.
Normatively, then, process costs for both sides abate in influence
almost precisely where they should. After all, these costs should matter least where due process and trial rights matter most.9 Moreover,
lent crimes, plea bargaining probably resembles civil litigation; law's shadow looms
large in these cases.").
187 See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 169; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 107;
Levin, supra note 65, at 90; Richman, supra note 108, at 963-64; Stuntz, supra note 117,
at 2563.
188 See UVILLER, supra note 5, at 179-80 (describing a prosecutor's
reasoning in
such a circumstance); Alschuler, supra note 42, at 107 ("[E]ven the weakness of the
state's case has little weight as a bargaining factor when [the crime is serious].").
189 See UVILLER, supra note 5, at
179.
190 See id. ("Some cases-some homicides or other
brutal crimes with more aggravating than mitigating circumstances-got no offer of reduction: plead to the indictment or try it."). Notably, when prosecutors stress sentence maximization it necessarily
leads to some sacrifice of conviction maximization. See Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2563
(reasoning that there are higher acquittal rates in murder cases because voters will
forgive acquittals but not leniency).
191 See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2472-74; Zacharias, supra note 1, at 1181-82.
192 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
193 See supra Part

II.B.

See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 300 n.12; RoSETr & CRESsEY, supra note 67, at 155
("It is when the punishments are most brutal that people justifiably look to the formal
legal system for help in controlling those in power."); Worden, supra note 45, at 340.
Our system has long recognized a need for enhanced process as stakes increase. See,
e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (limiting the constitutional jury right in
petty criminal cases); see alsoJohn H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the
194
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only a small class of defendants faces such high-stakes cases-a mere
fraction of the system's accused. The system could probably provide
this group full-dress trials without unduly taxing resources.
The results are not so rosy, however. Trials are a bit more frequent in serious cases, but even there, bargaining is still the primary
mode of case disposition. 9 5 The question is why defendants continue
to bargain in large numbers even when prosecutors are highly reluctant to provide lenient offers. The answer is overcharging.
Felony criminal and sentencing law is astonishingly broad because
legislators have every incentive to statutorily overcriminalize behavior,
set unduly harsh potential punishments, and then leave to the executive the job of divining what degree of enforcement best serves deterrence and the public good generally.' 96 Overbroad statutes serve the
legislature by minimizing the opportunity costs of legislative specification and maximizing legislative appearances of being tough on
crime.O'7 Prosecutors are thereby given extraordinary weapons. They
can charge harsh substantive crimes and then use questionable counts
and habitual-offender sentencing statutes as leverage in bargaining,
offering substantial so-called concessions that merely lead to convictions and sentences only on the warranted charges. 198 Generally, such

Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV.204, 223 (1979) ("Continental and Anglo-American
criminal procedural systems both exhibit as an organizing principle the idea that the
full set of procedures and safeguards appropriate for determining charges of serious
crime need not be extended to cases of petty crime."); Andrew M. Siegel, When Prosecutors Control CriminalCourt Dockets: Dispatches on History and Policyfrom a Land Time Forgot,
32 AM.J. CRIM. L. 325, 332 (2005) (describing the tradition at common law of providing "rough natural justice" to petty cases and formal process to more serious matters).
"' In 2002, the plea rate nationally was 95% for all state court felony convictions,
but was only 90% for violent felonies as a whole, 68% for murder, and 84% for rape.
U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTIcS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATIsTIcs ONLINE, at tbl.5.46.2002 (2003), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t5462002.pdf.
196 See ROSETr & CRESSEY, supra note 67, at 157; Richman, supra
note 108, at 959
n.69; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1965; Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2556-58;
Weinstein, supra note 65, at 1160-64. See generally WilliamJ. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505 (2001) (discussing the cycle whereby legislative overcriminalization necessarily leads to increased prosecutorial discretion, which
leads to further legislative criminalization).
197See Richman, supra note 108, at 960 n.69 ("[T]he public might blame
legislators
for failing to criminalize conduct it condemns, but will blame only prosecutors for
bringing charges in a marginal case. Given this dynamic, legislators will always be safer
if they err on the side of overinclusion."); Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2556-58 (using the
passage of the federal legislation on crack cocaine in the mid-1980s as an example).
I98See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 42; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 85-105; Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 311-16; Felkenes, supra note 34, at 119; McCoy & Mirra, supra
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counts are questionable not in the sense that the provable facts would
fail to meet statutory definitions (though this more extreme brand of

overcharging may occur); rather, such counts are questionable because they fall outside of operating systemic and communal norms.199
The result of overcharging is that plea prices typically start high in
serious cases, and prosecutors are less likely to permit much, if any,
negotiation.2 0 0 Duress and coercion become genuine concerns.20 ' Defendants who plead guilty end up receiving proportional sentencesbut only upon sacrifice of trial rights. In a system where as many as
nineteen out of twenty defendants plead guilty, the inescapable conclusion is that the postplea sentences are, in fact, the communally appropriate ones. After all, society would not tolerate disproportionately
lenient sentences for the overwhelming majority of defendants who
plead guilty in high-stakes (and highly public) felony cases. Conversely, the unlucky few who venture trial and lose are afforded disproportionate trial penalties. 202 Significantly, however, the problems
note 2, at 927; Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 1992; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3,
at 1920-21, 1965; Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2563; Wright & Miller, supra note 32, at 33;
Ronald F. Wright, TrialDistortion and the End of Innocence in Federal CriminalJustice, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005) (providing federal data to demonstrate the presence of prosecutorial overcharging).
199 See RoSETr & CRESSEY, supra note 67, at 156 (discussing courthouse
norms that
apply "no matter what the statutes might stipulate as a proper punishment"); Stuntz,
supra note 117, at 2554-58; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text. Because legislative prescription is so overbroad and overpunitive, the community may view lower
prices as optimal even in high-stakes cases where greater public oversight exists. See
Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2558 ("[P]rosecutors, at least those whose political antennae
are in good working order, will ... often prefer lower sentences than the legislature
has authorized.").
200 See Felkenes, supra note 34, at 119; Scott & Stuntz, supra note
3, at 1964-65.
201See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1964 ("[T)he
prosecutor... put[s] pressure
on [the defendant] to take the deal without further dickering.... The contract analogy is economic duress .... ); see also Tracey L. Meares, Rewardsfor Good Behavior: Influencing ProsecutorialDiscretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 851, 869 (1995) ("By charging the defendant with the most serious offenses that
the prosecutor believes the defendant's conduct supports, the prosecutor can push up
the trial penalty and limit, as a consequence, the defendant's ability to waive his right
to trial intelligently and voluntarily."). See generally Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of
Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 527 (1979). Indeed, the Court has noted that the "give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining" is a principal facet of its constitutionality. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 362 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202 See ROSETYr & CREssEY, supra note 67, at 156
("[T]here is a... tendency of officials to evoke the severe statutory [penalty] and to forget the less severe 'courthouse
law' when dealing with defendants who have unsuccessfully used... legal tactics.");
Lynch, supra note 1, at 120, 123. See generally David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper,
Does It Pay To Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts,
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of overcharging and consequent trial penalties are not innocence
problems. They are problems we should care about whether defendants are guilty or innocent.10
Significantly, these problems that affect high-stakes cases are not
of serious concern in the low-stakes cases that "few view as seriously
criminal." 20 4 There, the issue is more likely to be posttrial proportional
sentences far in excess of overlenient bargain rewards. Indeed, prosecutors may even believe that the arguably merited misdemeanor
charges already prescribe overly harsh penalties. 205 In any event,
prosecutors' abilities to overcharge are minimal, because misdemeanor charges typically carry the threat of exposure to sentences no
greater than one year in jail.
Ultimately, the distinction between trial penalties and plea rewards comes down to the difference between trading in trial costs and
trial rights. In low-stakes cases, if defendants see fit to join in the
communal pursuit of process-cost avoidance, they are rewarded with
sentence• bargains 206
of light sanctions and charge bargains of violations
or misdemeanors.
This quasi-happy story of the defendant who escapes costly undesired process on favorable terms is replaced in highstakes cases by the troubling account of the defendant who is forced
under threat
of trial penalty to forgo desired process to escape undue
•
207
punishment.
When process costs matter most, bargaining provides a

16 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 45 (1981-1982) (providing data to demonstrate a substantial
"trial tax"); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 1 U. ILL. L. REv. 37, 46-47 (1983) (discussing trial penalties);
Givelber, supra note 1, at 1396-1406 (same).
203 See Schulhofer, Disaster,supra note 1, at 1992 (calling for the repeal
of mandatory minimum sentences in order to reduce bargaining pressure, and noting that this
reform would affect all pleading defendants, not just the innocent). See generally Givelber, supra note 1, at 1393-99 (discussing trial tax as a burden that affects all defendants
and arguing that it should be eliminated).
FEELEY, supra note 11, at 280; accord Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2563 (" [T] he less
serious the crime, the more likely it is that the legislature has authorized punishments
no one really wishes to impose.").
205 See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text. As Professor
Stuntz noted,
"[C] riminal law and the law of sentencing define prosecutors' options, not litigation
outcomes .... [T]hey are items on a menu from which the prosecutor may order as
she wishes .... [H]er incentive is to get whatever meal she wants .... The menu does
not define the meal; the diner does." Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2549. Generally, the
prosecutor "has no incentive to order the biggest meal possible." Id.
206 See HEUMANN, supranote 11, at 123; see also
supra Parts IIl-IV.
207 See ROSETr & CRESSEY, supra note 67, at 155 ("When the
system is severe, the
accused is justifiably afraid to plead guilty to the crime charged.... [T]he path of acquiescence becomes less tempting .... No one casually pleads guilty to robbery ....
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beneficial exit strategy on defendant-optimal terms. But when process
matters most, recidivist offenders plead guilty because the prospect of
terrific sentences after trial conviction is simply too terrifying. This
distinction-between pleading guilty to avoid a trial tax on the exercise of constitutional rights and pleading guilty to avoid process
costs-has led some critics ° to condemn plea bargaining while gener-

ally accepting guilty pleas.

0

Courts have frowned on prosecutorial overcharging and have even
reversed explicit prosecutorial or judicial threats of trial penalties. 20 9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and several lower courts have repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to trial penalties in the absence of express evidence of vindictive motivation. ° In the usual
case, a prosecutor or judge may readily intimidate the defendant with
the threat of an excessive posttrial sentence on overcharged countsas long as the prosecutor or judge is careful with her words. Unsurprisingly, defendants choose to plea bargain, not because they necessarily want to do so in high-stakes cases, but because it is the sole sensible course.
VI. OBJECTIONS
To sum up, plea bargaining works best for innocent defendants
for whom the process is the punishment. However, because the system condones overcharging (and consequently substantial de facto

Conversely, only a man very confident of his ultimate vindication will chance capital
punishment.... ."); see also supra Part II.B.
208

See Alschuler, supra note 1, at 954-55 (finding guilty pleas, but not plea bar-

gains, acceptable); Langbein, supra note 194, at 213 (describing "that terrible attribute
that defines our plea bargaining and makes it coercive and unjust: the sentencing differential by which the accused is threatened with an increased sanction for conviction
after trial by comparison with that which is offered for confession and waiver of trial");
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1914 ("[A] cademic critics are not opposed to pleas, but
only to plea bargains."); Schulhofer, Disaster,supranote 1, at 1986 n.26 (same).
209 See, e.g., In re Lewallen, 590 P.2d 383
(Cal. 1979) (vacating the defendant's sentence when the sentencing judge indicated that the defendant should be treated more
harshly for exercising his trial right); State v. Boone, 235 S.E.2d 74 (N.C. Ct. App.
1977) (same); People v. Picciotti, 151 N.E.2d 191, 193-94 (N.Y. 1958) ("A plea of guilty
is, of course, frequently the result of a 'bargain,' but there is no bargain if a defendant
is told that, if he does not plead guilty, he will suffer [overcharging] consequences that
would not otherwise be visited upon him.").
210 See Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see alsoJAMES E. BOND, PLEA
BARGAINING AND GuILTY PLEAS 2-20 (2d ed. 1983) (collecting cases). A prosecutor
may even threaten to recharge under a habitual-offender statute if a defendant refuses
a plea. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358-59, 365.
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trial penalties), bargaining may also prove to be the least-bad option
for some innocent defendants for whom process would otherwise be
welcome.2 1 ' After all, trials are imperfect, particularly for recidivist defendants who cannot so easily challenge wrongful charges.
Accordingly, it seems wrongheaded and even unjust to allow a factually guilty
defendant to make a rational choice in the face of plea bargaining's
benefits and trial's potential penalties and travails, but to force an innocent defendant-who, by her nature as innocent and facing criminal charges, has already been systemically abused once-to risk,
against her will, an uncertain trial with significant downside.2 2 Yet,
that is precisely what some commentators and courts piously2 4demand
when they insist that the innocent should never plead guilty. 1
211 See
2
213

supra Part V.

See supra Part I.D.
See UVILLER, supra note 5, at 195-96; Church, supra note 3, at 516 ("It is...

somewhat disingenuous to argue that the innocent defendant suffers from being offered an alternative to the high stakes of a trial."); Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1975
("Forcing [the innocent] to use their rights at trial means compelling them to take the
risk of conviction or acquittal ....
");Scott & Stuntz, supra note 54, at 2013 ("[T he
choice is between permitting innocents to plead under the most favorable circumstances possible and forcing them to trial, where they risk vastly greater punishment.").
214 See, e.g.,
United States v. Price, 436 F.2d 303, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting that
an innocent defendant cannot plead guilty); United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726
(D. Conn. 1968) (same); People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)
(same); see also AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLEAS OF
GUILTY, No. 14-1.6 cmt. at 66 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter ABA, STANDARDS] ("Our system has concluded, in order to protect the innocent, that persons whose conduct does
not fall within the charges brought by a prosecutor should not be permitted to plead
guilty."); JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
PRACTICE § 15:10 (2005) ("Clients who maintain their innocence should go to trial and

[generally] should not be permitted to plead guilty."); Alschuler, supra note 5, at 128089, 1296-1301 (interviewing several attorneys who refuse ethically to abide by or participate in guilty pleas for defendants who claim innocence); Bibas, supra note 1, at
1382 ("It should go without saying that it is wrong to convict innocent defendants.
Thus, the law should hinder these convictions instead of facilitating them.. ..
");
Gerard V. Bradley, Plea Bargainingand the CriminalDefendant's Obligation To Plead Guilty,
40 S.TEX. L. REV. 65, 72, 77 (1999) (describing trials for innocent defendants as "morally necessary" and noting that the "common good is always served by the trial of an
innocent defendant (at least when a guilty plea is the alternative)"); Douglas A. Copeland, Missouri's Public Defender System, 62 J. MO. B. 10, 10 (2006) (" [P]lea bargaining a
defendant that may be innocent" "simply doesn't satisfy what the Constitution requires ....
");Dash, supra note 35, at 254 (noting that ajustice system that permits the
innocent to plead guilty is "a system of injustice"); Hessick & Saujani, supra note 156, at
197 ("[A]n innocent person pleading guilty is inexcusable.... [T]o convict innocent
people without a trial... exposes the failure to uphold criminal justice standards upon
which society is constructed."); Mitchell, supra note 156, at 320 (stressing the importance of innocent defendants taking cases to trial); Schulhofer, Disaster,supra note 1, at
1986; Jack B. Zimmermann, Things Aren't Always as They Seem at First Glance, 40 S.TEX.
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What are these critics' principal concerns? There seem to be four
concrete reasons for potential pause: bargained-for convictions of the
innocent may (1) engender disaffection with the criminal justice system; 21 5 (2) permit real perpetrators to escape punishment; 216 (3) incentivize prosecutors
to charge marginal cases because they can an• 217
ticipate pleas;
and (4) enable police misconduct by insulating
unlawful searches, seizures, and other police procedures from constitutional review. l s Further, these problems carry greater moral weight
if-as one might expect-they disproportionately affect poor or minority communities. 219
But these objections are unpersuasive. First, plea bargaining for
the innocent causes little, if any, surplus disaffection. No doubt, the
innocent defendant who must voice false words to get her bargain
may feel that the system has abused her twice. But the defendant's
enmity on that score is likely less than her aversion to a compelled
trial course (with all its attendant process costs and risks); otherwise
she would elect to fight on to trial. 220 Conversely, she may even derive
a degree of satisfaction from autonomously taking a role in determining her own fate. 221 In any event, even if false admissions feed her dis-

L. REV. 227, 228 (1999) ("[I]n my opinion, it borders on unethical conduct by a lawyer
to participate in a plea of guilty by a client who in fact is not guilty."); Eunyung Theresa
Oh, Note, Innocence After "Guilt": Postconviction DNA Relieffor Innocents Who Plead Guilty,
55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161, 168 (2004) ("[A] guilty plea should not be an option if [the
defendant] is innocent."); infra Part VII.B (discussing the perceived ethical problem of
guiltpleas for the innocent).
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 1, at 1382-88 (arguing that Alford
and nolo contendere pleas undermine public confidence in the accuracy and fainess of the criminal
justice system); Hessick & Saujani, supra note 156, at 205-06 (noting that the public can
lose confidence in the justice system if it learns that innocent defendants plead guilty).
216 See, e.g., Brandon J. Lester, Note, System Failure: The Case
for SupplantingNegotiation with Mediation in Plea Bargaining,20 OHIO ST.J. ON DISP. RESOL. 563, 570-71 & n.29
(2005).
217 See, e.g., Schulhofer, Disaster,supra note 1, at 2007 ("[C]onvicting
the innocent
is unequivocally easier in a world that permits plea bargaining."). See generally Strandburg, supranote 1.
218See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Policingthe Police: The Role of the Courts and
the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 324-32 (2005).
219See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT--RACE, CRIME,
AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 28-31 (1995) (discussing the disproportionate burden that blacks face in the
criminal justice system); AngelaJ. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 15-16 (1998) (describing the author's experience of
watching white defendants regularly be treated more leniently by prosecutors).
220 See supra note 185, infra notes 235-242, and accompanying
text.
221 See CASPER, supra note 57, at 49 ("[T]he 'participation' hypothesis... suggests
that a defendant, by participating in the decision about what sentence he is to receive,

2008]

PUNISHING THE INNOCENT

1161

illusions, this harm is of little concern because she is someone who
presumably has already lost faith in a system that leveled false charges
in the first instance.
Second, little concern exists over real perpetrators escaping punishment. Police and prosecutors do not commonly pursue other suspects once a defendant wins acquittal. After all, law enforcement officials generally arrest and prosecute wrongfully because they truly
believe that innocent defendants are guilty.2 When prosecutors lose
at trial, they do not conclude that the defendant must have been innocent after all; they conclude that the defendant got away with it.
Moreover, many innocent defendants are innocent not because they
did not commit the crime, but because no crime in fact was committed. This is particularly true of recidivist innocent defendants facing
petty charges. Petty charges often stem from police observation of
223
supposed crime, not police investigation of crime reports.
If the defendant is innocent, it is frequently because the police saw something
and wrongly assumed that it was criminal. 4
The weightiest objections are the third and fourth-that plea bargaining for innocent defendants incentivizes prosecutorial decisions
to charge and enables police misconduct. However, both concerns
are endemic to plea bargaining more generally. With respect to
prosecutors' charging decisions, the argument is that in a world without plea bargaining-and keeping resources constant-prosecutors
would be forced to take more cases to trial and therefore would be

will find the sentence and the whole proceeding more palatable... ."). But cf TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 31-39, 62-69, 161-62 (1990) (finding that defendants' perceptions of legitimacy are linked to fair procedures, not outcomes). The defendant may even recoup some personal vindication from what one lawyer described
as the "civil disobedience" of the false plea. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1306. I am reminded of the grandfather's deathbed admonition in Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man: "I
have been a traitor all my born days ....[Olvercome 'em with yeses, undermine 'em
with grins, agree 'em to death and destruction, let 'em swoller you till they vomit or
bust wide open." RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 16 (2d ed., Vintage Int'l 1995).
M See Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1970 ("Innocent persons are accused not because prosecutors are wicked but because these innocents appearto be guilty.").
23 See William J. Stuntz, Essay, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795,
1819-21 (1998) (describing how police enforcement of vice crimes-and street crime
prevention generally--is prospective as police go looking for crime, instead of simply
responding to reported crimes).
224 Trespassing is the clearest example. Usually, if the defendant
is innocent, it is
because she had permission to be at the location, not because another individual trespassed.
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225

more circumspect in their charging decisions.
This may or may not
be true. Professors Scott and Stuntz offer a persuasive counter:
[A] cheaper trial process [necessitated by increased trial frequency]
would likely make more [mistakes]. The combination of a higher error
rate and lower cost per trial would substantially reduce the cost to a

prosecutor of getting a case wrong .... That ..
adds
up to a reduced in226
centive to separate the innocent from the guilty.

In any event, the problem is not substantially worsened by the addition to the mix of rare innocent defendants. Because most defendants are in fact guilty, and the overwhelming majority pleads guilty,
the prosecutorial impulse to charge remains strong even if a few innocent defendants are forced to trial. Moreover, the defendant knows
he is innocent, but the prosecutor ex ante does not. And the prosecutor resists innocence signals. 22' This information asymmetry calls into
question any confidence that a greater exercise of charging discretion
would lead prosecutors to weed out cases against the innocent, as opposed to the guilty. Admittedly, prosecutors operating under resource constraints might decide to dismiss weak cases (which innocent
defendants are more likely to face). However, these prosecutors
would be least likely to exercise discretion in favor of recidivist defen228
dants (who are most likely to be innocent).
In the end, prosecutors
would probably go forward with cases charging recidivist defendants
and would end up weeding out principally the cases charging cleanrecord defendants or cases where witness cooperation was in doubtboth categories that are largely unreflective of (or even cut against)
innocence.229
With respect to enabling police misconduct, the argument is that
the exclusionary rule is the principal tool for combating that particu-

225

See Schulhofer, Disaster,supra note 1, at 2007.

Scott & Stuntz, supranote 54, at 2014.
supra notes 32-34, 38-45, and accompanying text. Because guilty defendants
copy innocent defendants' signals, permitting the innocent to plea bargain may increase deterrence for another reason: on balance, it produces greater increases in
conviction of the guilty than the innocent, because most defendants who proclaim innocence are in fact guilty. See Church, supra note 3, at 518-19 ("[A] choice for more
convictions is, at the very least, not inherently irrational.").
228 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency
of prosecutors to charge recidivists even in weak cases).
M See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying
text (discussing reasons for dismissal).
26

227 See

See generally Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, ProsecutorialResources, Plea Bargaining, and
the Decision To Go to Trial, 17J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149 (2001) (same).
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lar ill, but guilty pleas forestall the check. 230 But suppression hearings
already are ineffective as a safeguard against police misconduct because so few cases ever get to that point.13 Moreover, for the few cases
that ripen to substantive hearings, there are strong reasons to doubt
the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in policing the police. Judges are
especially loath to discredit even incredible police testimony if it
means razing evidence against defendants-especially recidivist defendants-whom judges may already believe are wasting judicial resources by not plea bargaining. 232 In short, the impact of permitting
innocent defendants to plea bargain is a mere drop in a very large and
full bucket. Instead, the problem is best addressed by instituting innovative alternative safeguards against police misconduct 23 3 or by limiting plea bargaining for the guilty and the innocent alike.3
As to all these concerns, perhaps the best response is that the innocent defendant seems a strange agent of social reform. By obliging
her to forego a plea, she is forced to internalize all costs and risks for
diffuse and somewhat abstract public benefit. 23 5 Certainly, evils like
230 See
231

Zeidman, supra note 218, at 324-33.

See id. at 332 ("[A] slew of guilty pleas... serve to insulate police practice from

scrutiny."); sources cited supra note 69 (noting that half of all New York City cases are
disposed of at the first appearance and the overwhelming majority are disposed of
within months).
232 See COMM'N To INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION & THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF N.Y., COMMISSION REPORT 42 (1994), available at http://www.parc.info/client-files/Special%20Reports/

4%20-%20Mollen%2OCommission%20-%20NYPD.pdf ("[Tihe tolerance the criminal
justice system exhibits takes the form of a lesser level of scrutiny when it comes to police officers' testimony. Fewer questions are asked; weaker explanations are accepted.").
233 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (proposing an "administrative or quasijudicial remedy against the government itself to afford compensation and restitution
for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated"). See generally Randy
E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive

PrinciplesofJustice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937 (1983) (discussing alternatives to an exclusionary
rule).

See Zeidman, supra note 218, at 332 (noting that guilty pleas "insulate police
practice from scrutiny").
235 Cf Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The
Wages of Antiquated ProceduralThinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 209 (discussing "bur234

den sharing"); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 54, at 2013 ("[Florcing [the innocent] to
trial.., stands every known notion of distributional justice on its head.... [L] osses,
especially unjust losses, are better spread than concentrated ....
").In a related context, one commentator persuasively offered the following response to those who would

compel defense attorneys to exhaust every available appeal on behalf of a death-row
"volunteer" (who wishes to give up his defenses): "[A] condemned and resigned in-
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police misconduct disproportionately impact poor and minority communities. But the most common innocent defendants-recidivists facing petty charges-often come from these very communities. And they
are not well served by compulsory trials.136 Accordingly, any societal
benefit can be realized only by discounting the preferences of inculpable defendants (from vulnerable communities) who least deserve
the added burdens.237
Ultimately, a system that respects the autonomy of the guilty to
forfeit trial rights should respect the autonomy of the innocent to do
the same. 2M Indeed, autonomy is a persuasive counterweight to constitutional objections to bargaining's trial penalties: "[T]he defendants who pay the heaviest penalties under the current regimedefendants who refuse to bargain, go to trial, and are convicted-at
least have the option, ex ante, of taking a different course of action., 239 Innocent defendants should have the same option.

mate is a human being, not a cause." Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on Lawyers'Ethics and Death Row Volunteers, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 800 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
236 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1928 ("[Albolishing plea bargaining
only
worsens this situation. Poor people are indeed disadvantaged in the criminal process
relative to rich people, but the relative disadvantage increases when trials are required."); cf. supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text (arguing that clients of selfdealing attorneys are better off plea bargaining in low-stakes cases).
237See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 320 ("It would do defendants
no favor to prevent them from striking the best deals they could in such sorry circumstances."); Scott
& Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1913 ("Parties who are denied either freedom to contract or
freedom to exchange entitlements suffer unnecessary constraints on their choices,
constraints that undermine the value of the entitlements themselves.").
238 See Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1976 ("Why
is liberty too important to be left
to the defendant whose life is at stake? Should we not say instead that liberty is too
important to deny effect to the defendant's choice?"); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at
1913, 1935; Zacharias, supra note 1, at 1143 ("The process must include the defendant
in a meaningful way. Defendants must.., have some meaningful influence over both
the nature of the plea offer and whether to accept it." (footnote omitted)); Charles W.
Smith, Note, Equivocal Guilty Pleas-Should They Be Accepted?, 75 DicK. L. REv. 366, 372
(1970) ("[A]n innocent man who asks for punishment may be foolish, but if he thinks
the bargain good, no injustice results from punishing him, for his will is done." (footnote omitted)).
239 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1933; see also CASPER,
supra note 57, at 50 ("The
defendant, if he does not like the bargain, may reject it and stand trial. If he accepts
the bargain, he cannot help but feel that his sentence is something that he consented
to and participated in bringing about, even if at the same time he resents the process... ." (misquoting Arnold Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 115 (U.S. Admin. of Criminal Justice ed., 1967))); supra notes 57,
221, and accompanying text (discussing participation as a reason that defendants prefer guilty pleas to trials).
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When an innocent defendant rationally chooses to plead guilty,
the system should want to protect access. It should recognize that at
least for the innocent defendant it is not bad that some deals are more
than just sensible-they would be improvident to reject. Particularly
where process costs are high and the consequences of conviction low,
a bargained-for conviction of an innocent accused is no evil; it is the
constructive minimization thereof-an unpleasant medicine softening
the symptoms of separate affliction. 240 This is the best response to Professor Schulhofer, a leading critic, who highlighted a "strong social
policy against punishing the innocent" and noted that "there is no
comparable social policy against inconveniencing an innocent (for
example, by requiring him to stand trial), if reducing his welfare in
this way would benefit others. 2 4 ' From this reasoning, Schulhofer
concluded that the system is normatively required to "protect innocents from the pressure (or temptation) of extremely lenient plea offers.2 42 But he drew too fine a line: the typical recidivist innocent defendant-facing petty charges and perhaps detained pretrial-would
find no practical distinction between punishment and trial inconvenience and no solace in systemic protections againstleniency.
VII. FOR FALSE PLEAS
Finally, I turn to the means of guaranteeing innocent defendants'
access to guilty pleas and plea bargaining's full benefits. I first address
why current options are insufficient and then propose a new solution:
reconstructing false words of guilt as accepted legal fictions.
A. Nolo Contendere and Alford Pleas: Nonsolutions
At common law, defendants could enter pleas of nolo contendere
to misdemeanor charges and thereby accept conviction without making express admissions . 2434 Presently, some jurisdictions have extended
nolo contendere pleas to certain felony charges, but, in the main, the

240 Cf Leipold, supra note 33, at 1301 ("For an innocent suspect charged with a

crime, there are only two possible outcomes: bad and really bad.").
241 Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 1986; accord Hessick & Saujani, supra note
156, at 241 (noting that an innocent defendant's choice to plead guilty may be "rational from his private perspective," but that such private choice is of no consequence
where it "imposes costs on society by undermining public confidence"); see also Bibas,
supra note 1, at 1386-88.
242 Schulhofer, Disaster,supra
note 1, at 2004-05.
243 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1370-71.
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practice is reserved for minor offenses.4
Separately, the Supreme
Court in North Carolina v. Alford formulated an additional vehicle for
rational-choice
pleas-available theoretically in cases of all degrees of
•245
seriousness.
In Alford, the Court held that an equivocal plea-where
the defendant pleads guilty while concurrently maintaining innocence-is constitutional as long as the plea constitutes "a voluntary
and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action. '4 6
Many scholars oppose both types of pleas-particularly Alford
pleas-as cynical instruments that sacrifice accuracy and communal
values for the questionable goods of efficient punishment and purported voluntary choice. 247 Others favor the pleas as evils necessary to
allow the innocent the option to plead guilty with a measure of honesty. 248 In truth, Alford and nolo contendere pleas are faulty not because they promote inaccurate convictions, but rather because they do
not make voluntary pleas for the innocent available or useful enough.
First, both types of pleas are inconsistently available. Many jurisdictions adopt blanket bans against the pleas. 49 Others permit the
pleas for only some types of defendants and crimes. 5 ° Indeed, in formulating the Alford doctrine, the Supreme Court expressly gave the
2
lower courts broad discretion over whether to accept the pleas. 5
24 See id.; see also Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 457 (1926)
(holding valid
nolo contendere pleas for federal charges that carry potential prison sentences). Of
the 1683 federal defendants who pled nolo contendere between 1997 and 2001, 90%
were charged with misdemeanor or petty offenses and more than half were charged
with traffic offenses. Leipold, supranote 22, at 1156 n.172.
245400 U.S. 25 (1970).
246 Id. at 31,
37.
247 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1382; Hessick & Saujani, supra
note 156, at 197.
24 See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1292, 1296-98; Easterbrook, supra note
3, at 320;
Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal
Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1073 (1987). See generally Alschuler, supra note 6.
249 See, e.g., Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983) (holding
that Indiana
does not recognize Alford pleas); State v. Korzenowski, 303 A.2d 596, 597 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (affirming a state court directive to reject such pleas), cert. denied, 307 A.2d 100 (N.J. 1973); Eisenberg v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 485 A.2d 511,
514 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (noting that Pennsylvania does not recognize Alford pleas).
Presently, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia allow nolo contendere pleas
in at least some types of cases, and forty-seven states and the District of Columbia theoretically allow Alford pleas. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1371 n.44, 1372 n.52. However, far
fewer states have actually applied the Alford doctrine. See Hessick & Saujani, supra note
156, at 198 (finding only thirteen states to have "applied" Alford).
250 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1370-71, 1379-80; supra notes
243-244 and accompanying text.
251 See 400 U.S. at 38 n.lI ("Our holding does not mean that a trial
judge must ac-

cept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to
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Consequently, even in jurisdictions where the pleas are theoretically
available, final say over availability is left not to defendants, but to the
vagaries of individual lawyers and judges.' 5' For example, nothwithstanding the ostensible availability of the pleas in federal courts, the
Department of Justice has expressly discouraged its assistants from offering Alford pleas and
S 253requires supervisory approval before assistants
may make exceptions.
Even defense attorneys-out of professional
discomfort-may opt not to pursue or participate in Alford pleas. 54
Consequently, Alford has developed into a doctrine applied by "whim"
that is "subject to no restrictions and no standards," where in essence
"defendants have no rights and trial courts can do no wrong."2 5 5 And
nolo contendere pleas are relegated by history and practice to only limited classes of cases in limited jurisdictions. 256 The result is arbitrary
2 7
availability; some innocent defendants may plead, but many may not. 5

plead. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to
have his guilty plea accepted by the court .... States may bar their courts from accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence.").
252 See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1304 ("The refusal of most trial judges to accept
Alford pleas is probably attributable in part to their personal conviction that these pleas
are improper .. "); Barkai, supra note 1, at 123-24 ("[T]he rejection of an equivocal
plea falls in the vast area of district court discretion that is virtually unreviewable.");
Bibas, supra note 1, at 1379-81, 1386 (noting differing levels of acceptance among defense laywers, prosecutors, and the public). For cases, see, for example, United States
v. Melendrez-Salas, 466 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1972) (quoting Alford to find no abuse
of discretion in a judge's refusal of the defendant's plea); State v. Brumfield, 511 P.2d
1256, 1257-58 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (same); and State v. Knutson, 523 P.2d 967, 968-69
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (same). See also Shipley, supra note 248, at 1069 n.58 ("[M]ost
judges remain leery of Alford pleas and accept the Supreme Court's invitation to...
reject them."). Contra United States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's plea "merely because the defendant refuse [d]" to admit guilt).
253 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATroRNEys' MANUAL § 9-16.015
(2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usam/title9/
16mcrm.htm#9-16.015 (requiring approval and "the most unusual of circumstances");
Bibas, supra note 1, at 1379-80, 1386.
254 See, e.g., HALL, supra note 214, § 15:10 (noting that defense
attorneys have professional discretion to pursue or forgo Alford pleas); see also United States ex rel. Tillman
v. Alldredge, 350 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that counsel's failure to
pursue plea bargaining where defendant maintained his innocence was not ineffective); infra notes 279-281 and accompanying text (discussing the perceived ethical
problem of guilty pleas for the innocent, and citing sources that would prohibit or
make discretionary defense attorneys' involvement in such pleas).
255 Alschuler, supra note
5, at 1301.
256 See supra notes 243-244,
249-250, and accompanying text.
257 See Barkai, supra note 1, at 125 (describing
the use and impact of Alford in the
federal system to be "very limited"); Shipley, supra note 248, at 1064, 1068 (describing
Alford's application as "haphazard," "unpredictable," and "rarely accept[ed]"). But see
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Second, both types of plea fail to provide defendants with the full
benefits of their bargains. Instead, defendants may suffer multiple
detrimental sentencing and corollary consequences for entering pleas
without admitting guilt. For example, if defendants have entered into
charge bargains with open sentences, judges may •.
increase
sentences
258

toward the statutory maximum for lack of contrtion.
Additionally,
defendants often are required to make factual admissions to the
crimes of conviction in order to secure release on parole, to minimize
grading under the Sex Offender Registration Act, and to successfully
complete probation or mandatory treatment programs. 259 Finally,
prosecutors that choose to accept the pleas may demand a higher
260
sanction as the quid pro quo price of acquiescence.
Third, with respect only to Alford pleas, these pleas raise genuine
concern over the conviction not of the innocent but of defendants
who do not, in fact, wish to plead at all. At bottom, equivocation is an
imprecise check for the possibility that an innocent defendant is
falsely pleading guilty. It is a far more accurate check for the possibility that a defendant is pleading involuntarily-a separate (and constitutional) concern.26 ' Defendants who equivocate generally do so because they are unsure that the guilty plea is the right course of
action. 262 Their hesitation signals that something is amiss-that they

Bibas, supranote 1, at 1375 (noting more frequent usage of Alford pleas, particularly in
state courts).
258See Leipold, supra note 22, at 1158 ("[C]ourts are unlikely to find contrition or
remorse buried in a claim that a defendant is really a victim."); Bryan H. Ward, A Plea
Best Not Taken: Why CriminalDefendants Should Avoid the Alford Plea, 68 MO. L. REV. 913,
921-26 (2003) (citing cases where courts took the defendant's lack of remorse into account in order to increase sentences after Alford pleas).
259See Ward, supra note 258, at 926-35 (citing cases where Alford pleas
produced
defendant-negative parole, probation, and sex-offender consequences).
260 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1378 n.81; E-mail
from Alafair S. Burke, Professor of
Law, Hofstra Univ. Sch. of Law, former Deputy Dist. Att'y, Portland, Or., to author
(May 6, 2007, 15:37 CST) (on file with author). This is especially true for nolo contendere pleas that (at least in theory) cannot be used as evidence in future civil suits.
See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 1 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 177, at 666 (2d
ed. 1982) ("The principal difference between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo contendere is that the latter may not be used against the defendant in a civil action based
upon the same acts."). Prosecutors justifiably may view this benefit as requiring a corresponding defense concession.
261 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748 (1970) (holding that pleas are
constitutionally required to be knowing and voluntary).
262 See Smith, supra note 238, at 375 ("By his equivocation,
the pleader has signalled [sic] his dissatisfaction with the bargain, or at the very least, his latent unwillingness to make it.").
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26s
do not view pleading as the best option, even if it is.
A particular
defendant might demur precisely because she is innocent (or believes
herself to be) or for wholly different reasons. Regardless, a court
should not deem such a plea voluntary. 264 Moreover, to the extent
concerns exist over imperfect agency-that domineering defense lawyers might force unwilling defendants to plead guilty against their
wills-then permitting equivocal pleas seems a particularly poor idea.
The equivocating defendant is of two minds; a necessary question is
which mind is hers and which is her lawyer's. 265 Conversely, a defendant who very much wants a bargain would seem most ready to voice
words of guilt-true or not-that consummate the bargain. When defense counsel explains that asking for an Alford plea might complicate
matters, a willing defendant generally protests no further. 266 Those

263Accordingly, the pleas are prime fodder for appellate
challenge. See Bibas, su-

pra note 1, at 1379 (noting fear among prosecutors that Alford pleas are "vulnerable"
on appeal, "thus undercutting finality").
264 See Smith, supra note 238, at 374-75; cf State v. Bouie, 817 So. 2d 48 (La. 2002)
(holding that the defendant had not pled guilty voluntarily where the defendant
equivocated but ultimately relented to the trial court's pressure to take a plea that the
trial court believed was in the defendant's best interest). The facts of Alford are instructive on this point. The defendant tried to withdraw his plea as involuntary, because, among other reasons, he had contested his guilt and the court had disregarded
his protestations. The plea transcript hints at involuntariness: "[Ylou all got me to
plead guilty.... You told me to plead guilty, right. I don't-I'm not guilty but I plead
guilty." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 n.2 (1970). It seems at least plausible
that the defendant was about to say, "I don't-want to plead." Cf Ward, supra note 258,
at 917 ("Defense attorneys should keep in mind that the Alford plea was not a fundamental right wrested from an unwilling prosecution, but rather was a means by which
the prosecution was able to retain a questionable plea of guilty.").
115 Cf Bouie, 817 So. 2d at 55-56 ("[T]he defendant's continuing reservations about
his culpability. . . ,which he never entirely put aside during the colloquy, did not prevent him from entering a voluntary guilty plea. However, Alford presupposes that the
defendant 'must be permitted to judge for himself in this respect."' (quoting Alford,
400 U.S. at 33)).
266 See Smith, supra note 238, at 374-75 ("[A] truly innocent,
rational man who, for
his own reasons, chooses to 'take the rap' is least likely of all to tergiversate when
pleading.... Indeed, it may well be that chief among the equivocators are the merely
reluctant guilty and the dissemblers." (footnote omitted)); see also UVILLER, supra note
5, at 195 ("[I]nnocent defendants... say[] what [i]s required to get the bargain plea
they want[]."); Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1305 (noting that defense attorneys sometimes counsel clients to get their "lines right" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Richard H. Kuh, Book Review, 82 HARV. L. REV. 497, at 500-01 (1968) (reviewing
DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL (1966)) (noting that defendants just "mouth[]" the prearranged
words, "whether or not they are truthful"); cf Bibas supra note 1, at 1378 n.81, 1370
n.87 (relating the experience of one defense lawyer that innocent defendants are
more apt to use "classic guilty pleas" and that defendants whose nolo contendere pleas
were rejected by one judge all went ahead with guilty pleas).
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innocent defendants who are voluntarily pleading guilty rationally
recognize-out of concerns over process costs or trial penalties-that
swallowing pride and stating guilt on the record are the smoothest
roads forward.
B. False Pleas: The Solution
Criminal law-like
t • 267 most other law-consists in part of a collection
of accepted fictions.
For example, defendants are considered to
268
have constructive knowledge of statutory text and meaning.
Defendants are presumed innocent, notwithstanding the mathematical certainty that they are more likely culprits than any other person present
in the courtroom. 269 Fictions permeate even the bargaining process:
in many jurisdictions, defendants must concur on the record that no
promises were made in exchange for their pleas even though bargains
clearly were struck. 2 7° And courts premise guilty-plea discounts on a
dubious contrition, claimed inherent in the acceptance of bargainedfor deals. 2 1 Even certain discrete breeds of false defendant testimony
are acceptable. Defendants must verbally enter a plea of "not guilty"
at arraignments -even when they most certainly are-in order to
272
push a case on to trial.
Courts have allowed defendants to plead
guilty to daytime burglaries to satisfy lesser
even when the
t •--charges,
272
crimes indisputably occurred in dark of night.
Courts have upheld
267See H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'AS IF' 34 (1924) ("In the
fictiojuris ...

something that has not happened is regarded as having happened, or vice versa ....
Roman law is permeated throughout by such fictions, and in modem countries ...
juristic fictions have undergone additional development.").
26 See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72
FORDHAM L. REv.
885, 886 (2004) (arguing that the rule of lenity's notice rationale is undermined by the
fact that "criminals do not read statutes").
269 See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1370-71 (1971).
270 See Kuh, supra note 266,
at 500.
271See UVILLER, supra note 5,at 183 (noting thatjudges accept the
premise of contrition "with a straight face"); Kuh, supra note 266, at 501 (noting the guilty plea's "fiction of 'remorse'").
2
See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., "How Do You Plead, Guilty or Not Guilty?": Does the Plea
Inquiry Violate the Defendant's Right to Silence?, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1409, 1411 (2005)
("What is for lawyers and judges a casually used term-of-art is viewed by ordinary people as a serious moral claim by the defendant that he did not commit the crime. In
order to make the state prove its case, the defendant must make a false statement.").
273 The frequency of such factual reinvention led one police officer to
complain,
"You'd think all burglaries were committed in Detroit at high noon." BOND, supra note
210, at 3-112 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stuntz, supra note 117, at
2557 (noting the prevalence in federal cases of "fact bargaining" over the quantity of
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pleas to "hypothetical crimes" that exist in no penal code and require
274
impossible mens rea.
All of these falsehoods generally muster little
objection, because they are "recognized as having utility"-Professor
27
Lon Fuller's paradigmatic definition of legal fictions. 5
The puzzle is why the system draws the line on the ultimate question of culpability. 276 False pleas are only less truthful than these other
fictions by degree. A defendant who pleads to a factually impossible
crime could not have committed it-just like an innocent defendant
who pleads to a genuine crime. The answer to the puzzle lies elsewhere then: the system accepts pleas to hypothetical or incoherent
charges because the defendant still admits truthfully that she did
"something wrong." The system authorizes all kinds of expedient
falsehood, but stops short at lies that cut against blameworthiness.
Rather, it finds something sacrosanct and inviolable-even magicalin the bottom-line accuracy of the defendant's admission that she behaved (in some fashion) illegally. 27 Institutional actors (who should
know
better) hold on to this last vestige of an antiquated truth-seeking
•. ,278
ideal.
Accordingly, professional responsibility materials on the topic
of false pleas for the innocent almost uniformly condemn-or at least
frown upon-the defense practice of allowing or assisting an innocent

possessed drugs (internal quotation marks omitted)); Colquitt, supra note 176, at 74041 (collecting similar cases).
274See, e.g., People ex rel. Bassin v. Isreal, 335 N.E.2d 53
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (upholding a plea to the nonexistent lesser charge of attempted voluntary manslaughter);
People v. Castro, 44 A.D.2d 808, 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) ("[A] defendant may plead
to a crime which does not even exist and the plea is valid. Such a hypothetical crime
has no elements, yet their absence does not affect the plea." (citation omitted)), affd,
339 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1975); Colquitt, supra note 176, at 712, 740-41 (collecting cases).
275 LON

276See

L. FULLER,LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).

supra note 214 and accompanying text; infra notes 279-281, 290-294, and
accompanying text.
277 Cf Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargainingand the Supreme Court, 21 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 757, 832 (1988) ("[A] ...theme runs consistently through the cases. Pleas of
guilty are 'grave and solemn' acts that are valid because they represent 'the defendant's admission in open court that he committed the acts charged .... .'" (quoting
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970))); David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty
Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 35 (1984) ("[T]he argument runs...
that acceptance of a guilty plea is a far more solemn and significant event ....
[S]ociety has an interest in insuring that only the guilty are convicted and punished.
Thus, a guilty plea, once accepted, comes closer to an adjudication of fact....").
278 See Givelber, supra note 32, at 1172 ("Believing that those
charged are guilty
also operates as a balm upon the conscience of those who administer criminal justice
in our society. No one wants to participate in a practice that they believe routinely imprisons the innocent.... ."); see also infra notes 282-283 and accompanying text.
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defendant to plead guilty falsely.179 And the limited case law on this
280
ethical question has held likewise.
Indeed, no less respected an authority than Chief Justice Warren Burger has declared the practice
unethical: "When an accused tells the court he committed the act

279

See ABA,

STANDARDS,

supra note 214, at No. 14-1.6 cmt. at 66 (outlining three

important purposes of requiring a factual basis for a plea, including assuring that the
defendant is guilty, eliminating the fact-finding necessity if a plea is challenged, and
aiding the sentencing phase); AM. BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 5.3, at 241 (1970) ("If the accused discloses to the lawyer facts which negate guilt and the lawyer's investigation does not reveal a conflict with the facts disclosed but the accused persists in entering a plea of guilty, the lawyer may not properly
participate in presenting a guilty plea, without disclosure to the court."); see also AMSTERDAM, supra note 157, § 215, at 363 (noting that section 215 leaves the decision to a
lawyer's "individual conscience" and that even when a plea bargain is "distinctly to the
client's best advantage," a "hard decision follows"); HALL, supra note 214, § 15:10
("There is ...no ethical or constitutional duty on counsel to negotiate a plea for the
defendant who insists on his or her innocence."); Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1280-89,
1296-1306 (discussing a potential ethical problem and defense attorneys' ethical concerns); Bradley, supra note 214, at 77 ("The common good is always served by the trial
of an innocent defendant (at least when a guilty plea is the alternative)."); Warren E.
Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5
AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 15 (1966) (arguing that a laywer "must... consult his private conscience," as well as remember that "he is an officer of the court"); Copeland, supra
note 214, at 10 (stating that plea bargaining potentially innocent defenants is not a
constitutional method of addressing overwhelmed public defender offices); Bradley J.
Huestis, New Developments in PretrialProcedures: Evolution or Revolution , 2002 ARMY LAW.
20, 30 ("The military accused may not plead guilty unless he honestly and reasonably
believes he is guilty ....
");Zimmermann, supra note 214, at 228 ("[I]t borders on unethical conduct by a lawyer to participate in a plea of guilty by a client who in fact is not
guilty.... [F]or a lawyer to stand silent while the innocent defendant lies to the judge
(falsely confessing guilt) is to perpetrate a fraud on the court."); supra note 214 and
accompanying text (citing sources insisting that the innocent should not plead guilty).
280 See, e.g.,
Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 119 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating
that "[w]e have no hesitation in saying that an attorney, an officer of the court, may
not counsel or practice such a deliberate deception," such as permitting the defendant
to "state[] facts that show he is guilty," thereby "departing from truth if need be");
United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Conn. 1968) (noting that it is "utterly unreasonable for counsel to recommend a guilty plea to a defendant without first
cautioning him that, no matter what, he should not plead guilty unless he believed
himself guilty"); People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (noting
that Michigan state courts are required to "probe deeper" into "guilt or innocence");
supra note 214 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has also expressed a will
to limit pleas to the factually guilty only. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 224
n.14 (1978) (noting that NewJersey statutes allow for ajudge to reject a plea absent a
factual basis); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (requiring a factual basis before a court can take an equivocal plea); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758
(1970) ("We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty
pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants...
would falsely condemn themselves.").
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charged to induce acceptance of the guilty plea, the lawyer to whom
contrary statements have been made owes a duty to the court to disclose such contrary28 statements so that the court can explore and resolve the conflict., 1
I have shown, I hope, that blameworthiness does not deserve the
import ascribed to it. Righteous judicial pronouncements to the contrary only "demonstrate[] how easily judges-even wise and sophisticatedjudges-come to believe in the forms and trappings of their own
rituals.",282 Ultimately, there exists a marked disconnect between systemic fact and hollow ideals when it comes to guilt and innocence.
The fact is that the criminal justice system no longer has much to do
with transparent adversarial truth-seeking; it has far more to do with
283
the opaque processing of (rightful or wrongful) recent arrests.
Guilty pleas are thus no more than sterile administrative procedures,
and plea bargaining is merely the mechanism that ensures that these
procedures are carried out efficiently. 28 4 Administrative procedures,
of course, possess no magic or endogenous moral value; they are at
most pragmatic. Accordingly, there is nothing left that is sacrosanct
about defendant admissions. And there is no good reason to act in
deference to empty principles that ignore the realities of punishment
and serve no practical purposes other than compelling the undeserved innocent accused to bear unwelcome process or trial-penalty
risk. All that recommends prohibition of false pleas is visceral distaste-and that is not enough.
Conversely, there are many reasons to recommend false pleas:
they allow innocent defendants to receive the same bargaining and
pleading benefits as the guilty; they ensure that pleas are limited to
the voluntary innocent (only to those so eager to plead guilty that they
Burger, supra note 279, at 15.
UVILLER, supra note 5, at 196; cf supra note 278 and accompanying text.
283 See supra Parts I-V. Trials are not so obviously
the "communal morality plays"
they are sometimes taken to be, because trial biases diminish confidence that trials accurately separate the recidivist innocent defendants from the guilty defendants. See
Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-BargainingSystem, 88 CORNELL
L. REv. 1425, 1425 (2003); supra Part I.D.
284 See Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation
in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 916-18, 920-22 (2006) (arguing that, contrary to its history,
American criminal justice has become the exclusive province of professional insiders
who depend on "[s]wift dispositions" and "low-visibility procedures" at the points of
arrest, charge, and plea); cf EUGENE O'NEILL, THE ICEMAN COMETH 12 (2006) ("To
hell with the truth! As the history of the world proves, the truth has no bearing on
anything. It's irrelevant and immaterial, as the lawyers say. The lie of a pipe dream is
what gives life to the whole misbegotten mad lot of us .. ").
281
282
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are willing to swallow principle and utter false words); and presumably
they promote judicial efficiency. 2s Like all good legal fictions, false
admissions are just another means of bending
law to "promote [] func26
tion, form, and sometimes even fairness."
Admittedly, even without my proposal, plea bargaining for many
innocent defendants will proceed apace. Manyjudges and lawyers eagerly resist righteous interdictions that might interfere with the welcome processing of pleas. 21 7 Accordingly, a great many defense attorneys currently counsel their innocent clients to plead guilty even when
no judicially sanctioned devices (like equivocal or no-contest pleas)
are available.2 8 A few of these attorneys may even accept the practice
as a quasi-legal fiction already. 289 But most will not admit that senti285

See supra notes 250-266 and accompanying text.

286

Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 875 (1986). By con-

trast, false testimony of innocence-of the kind condemned in Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986)-serves no recognizable systemic value.
287See supra Part
III.
288 See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1284-87, 1296,
1305-06 (interviewing defense attorneys). Many defense attorneys make use of the convenient dodge that they cannot
conclusively know that clients are factually innocent. See William H. Simon, Essay, The
Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1705-06 (1993) (describing how de-

fense attorneys rely on judges and juries to discern the truth); cf Monroe H. Freedman, But Only If You "Know," in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
LAWYER: PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 135, 138 (RodneyJ. Uphoff ed.
1995) (discussing the degree of knowledge of guilt necessary to trigger a defense attorney's ethical obligation not to suborn perjury). There are some circumstances,
however, where knowledge of innocence is clear. For example, I represented several
defendants charged with trespass in buildings where they in fact lived or were lawfully
visiting relatives. Occasionally, I would verify this defense to a substantial certainty, but
the defendant would still plead guilty because compelling dismissal would require
weeks of waiting. Similarly, I represented some defendants with ironclad alibi defenses. A few of these defendants, facing petty cases, preferred immediate disposition.
See HEUMANN, supranote 11, at 73 (noting a lawyer who hired a psychiatrist to question
a felony defendant under truth serum, during which the defendant passed the truth
test, but pled to a fifty-dollar fine); Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1296 (quoting a defense
attorney saying, "I have entered guilty pleas for defendants whom I knew to be innocent.... Year after year, these [repeat] clients would... 'level' without hesitation.
Then they would come ...and say, 'It's a bum rap this time.' There would be no reason... to lie; the case would be like all the others."); cf Simon, supra, at 1706 ("To
conclude that [defense counsel] 'knows' these things, we do not have to attribute any
cosmic, pre-Heisenbergian certainty to her.... .").
289See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1306 (quoting a defense attorney's
claim that an
admission of guilt is "a fiction, like Nevada domicile in a divorce action" (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Conn.
1968) (finding "utterly unreasonable" defense counsel's advice that his client should
only plead guilty if he believes himself to be guilty); State v. Kaufman, 2 N.W. 275, 276
(Iowa 1879) ("Reasons other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a defendant to
so plead ...and the right of the defendant to so plead has never been doubted."). It

2008]

PUNISHING THE INNOCENT

1175

ment in polite company. And some other defense attorneys take seriously their perceived responsibilities to ship innocent clients off to
uncertain trials via costly process. For example, in United States v. Price,
the defense attorney indicated on the record that he would not allow
his client to plead guilty: "He tells me he didn't do it.I told him that
under those circumstances, I can't proffer the plea to the Court."290
Likewise, Professor Alschuler interviewed several prosecutors and defense attorneys who categorically refused to permit or participate in
plea bargains or guilty pleas for the innocent.29 1 Indeed, some of
these defense attorneys indicated that their offices had express policies proscribing the practice.2 2 One senior public defender noted
that in his office, lawyers would typically withdraw from
cases if they
2 93
believed innocent clients wished to falsely plead guilty.
In such a climate, even those defense attorneys who would otherwise see fit to counsel false pleas may do so only with great profes-

would seem that Professor Alschuler and Judge Easterbrook fall squarely in this camp.
See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1300 n.328 ("Why the problem of the 'innocent' defendant... [is] viewed primarily as an ethical problem.., is somewhat mystifying. Apparently guilty pleas were once viewed unquestioningly as factual confessions to the
court... [but presently] it might be proper to employ the 'guilty-plea strategy'...
[and the] 'ethical problem' largely disappears."); Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 320.
290436 F.2d 303, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
291Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1280-89, 1296-1301; see also Glatt v. Johnson,
No. 00CV-506-A, 2001 WL 432355, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2001) (noting favorably defense
lawyer's practice of advising clients "not to plead guilty unless they are guilty");
Mitchell, supra note 156, ac 320-21 (lauding a public defender office where "almost no
defendants who protested their innocence (and there were many), whether out on bail
or not, pled guilty"); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not 7o Plead: Effective Assistance and

Client-Centered Counseling,39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 905 (1998) ("There are defense attorneys
who believe that once a client asserts innocence, professional ethics or individual morality render plea discussions inappropriate."); Mills, supra note 125, at 61-62 (quoting
a discussion between a defense lawyer and a detained client in which the defense lawyer refused to let his client plead unless he stopped privately insisting on innocence);
supra note 214 and accompanying text (citing several attorneys who insist that the innocent should not plead guilty).
292 Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1280-89.
29 Id. at 1285-86.
Likewise, judges often warn clients not to plead guilty unless
they are guilty. See, e.g.,
Frederick v. Warden, 308 F.3d 192, 194 n.3 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting a judge telling the defendant, "I want to warn you not to plead guilty unless
you are, in fact, guilty .. ");Pursley v. United States, 391 F.2d 224, 224-25 (5th Cir.
1968) ("You cannot plead guilty unless you are actually guilty .. ");Stone v. United
States, No. 99-CV-0461, 1999 WL 325406, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 17, 1999); Mosley v.
United States, No. 95-CV-0069, 92-CR-0051, 1995 WL 118180, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
1995); United States v. Messimer, 598 F. Supp. 992, 998 (C.D. Cal. 1984); United States
v. Chaney, No. ACM 36138, 2006 WL 2843492, at *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 29,
2006) ("If you don't believe that you're guilty, you should not plead guilty for any reason."); Cobb v. State, 895 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
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sional discomfort-speaking in hushed tones for fear of disapproval,
interference, or, worse, discipline. 4
Consequently, my proposal
would have value even if most innocent defendants who wish to plead
guilty do so already as part of underground practice. My proposal
would strengthen the argument for scrapping the ineffective and
problematic nolo contendere and Alford doctrines. More than that,
my proposal would provide much-needed guidance to systemic actors.
By embracing dishonest pleas, the proposal might even (perhaps
counterintuitively) promote a healthy kind of institutional honesty,
visible only to criminal justice functionaries (who trade in legal fictions and should be allowed to know what does and does not qualify),
and necessarily invisible to a citizenry
that benefits from the perma5
nency of its truth-seeking illusions.2
The false plea would become just another sound legal tactic over
which defense attorneys may entertain no professional qualms.
Rather, they would be obliged to assist in such strategynotwithstanding conflicting personal principles over appropriate systemic function. A lawyer who would refuse to advance an accepted legal fiction would do no less than place her own self-interest above her
client's. Zealous advocacy clearly requires more.

1I94
practiced in front of certain judges-admittedly a minority-who would foreclose plea bargaining that too closely followed prior on- or even off-the-record innocence claims. One judge in particular bore especial hostility toward the prospect of
rational-choice pleas. He loudly denounced the unprofessionalism of any lawyer
whom he felt was advancing a guilty plea for a defendant with a strong claim of innocence. He would even sometimes offer the unhelpful and possibly untrue on-therecord promise to pleading defendants, in sum and substance: "If you are innocent,
go to trial; you will be acquitted." Cf Givelber, supra note 1, at 1396 ("[A] defendant
against whom the Government is prepared to proceed to trial is convictable, even if
innocent."). Likewise, I encountered a few prosecutors and defense attorneysparticularly the new and unassimilated-who would draw similar fine lines against
pleas for those who proclaimed innocence. Cf HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 47-152
(describing adaptation process whereby new judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys gradually abandon traditional adversarial roles). I observed the same at the federal level. As an associate at a boutique white-collar defense firm, I sat in on a ludicrous hours-long lawyer-client face-off where the partner refused to permit the client
to plead guilty unless the client would stop privately protesting innocence and admit to
having done "something wrong."
15 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1363-64, 1386-88, 1403 n.215 ("[S]ociety has a strong
interest in ensuring that criminal convictions are both just and perceived as just....
Though many plea bargains are less than honest.., at least they do not proclaim this
dishonesty or inconsistency openly."); cf In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("It is
critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by... [fears that] innocent men are being condemned."). See generally Bibas, supra note 284, at 912-22 (discussing how professional criminal-justice insiders operate out of view of lay outsiders).
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What then are the nuts and bolts of my proposal? A weak version
might just involve abrogation of case law and official ethical instruction hindering innocent defendants from plea bargaining or pleading
guilty.29 6

Such ethical prescription by silence runs the risk of doing

very little to change the status quo. Many institutional actors would
facilitate (at least quietly) plea bargains and guilty pleas for the innocent, a few others would not, and all would lack clear guidance. A
stronger version would speak positively, sanctioning plea bargaining
for the innocent, declaring false pleas to be a legal fiction, and affirmatively requiring counsel to advise clients about outstanding offers
and to facilitate knowing and voluntary client decisions to plead
guilty. In essence, this would be no more than an admonition to defense counsel to take seriously-even when clients profess innocence-the established rules that a lawyer (i) "should promptly communicate and explain to the defendant all plea offers made by the
prosecuting attorney," (ii) "should advise the defendant of the alternatives available," (iii) "should use reasonable persuasion to guide the
client to a sound decision," and (iv) "should ensure that the decision
whether to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is ultimately
made by the defendant. '297 Open questions remain,
of course, such as
• ,,298
the appropriate degree of "reasonable persuasion.
But it is proba-

See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 279-280.
STANDARDS, supra note 214, at No. 14-3.2(a)-(c) cmt. at 124; see also AM.
BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 279, § 5.1 cmt.
at 235; AMSTERDAM, supra note 157, § 201, at 339. At present, courts do not always give
these obligations their due weight, especially when clients protest innocence. See, e.g.,
Guerrero v. United States, 383 F.3d 409, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that there was
no prejudice due to an undisclosed offer because the defendant protested innocence
and therefore would not have accepted the offer in any event); Purdy v. United States,
208 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that no per se rule exists that counsel must advise a client whether to plead guilty); United States ex rel. Tillman v. Alldredge, 350 F.
Supp. 189, 195-96 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("1 am not prepared to hold that an attorney who
fails to explore the possibility of a plea bargain on behalf of a client who insists that he
is innocent, has represented his client ineffectively."); State v. Powell, 578 N.W.2d 727,
732 (Minn. 1998) ("Because of respondent's insistence of his innocence.., and rejection of the first plea offer, counsel could have reasonable [sic] concluded that additional discussion [with his client about a second plea offer] would have served no purpose."); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 688 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Pa. 1997) (Castille, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("My research reveals only one case in which
a federal court granted a writ of habeas corpus based solely on a claim that trial counsel's advice to reject a plea offer and to proceed to trial was ineffective.").
29 The answer is no doubt case-specific. Admittedly, even light
pressure on a client who proclaims innocence may strain attorney-client relations, but a good lawyer
can provide effective counsel tactfully. Especially where a plea is particularly favorable,
296

297 ABA,
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bly enough to leave such questions to the constraints of generalized
ethical directives against self-dealing.2
CONCLUSION

Innocent defendants fall into two very loose categories for the
purposes of plea bargaining and guilty pleas: those for whom process
costs should matter (i.e., defendants in low-stakes cases, particularly recidivists), and those for whom process should matter (i.e., defendants
in high-stakes cases, particularly recidivists).
In the former category, innocent defendants are plainly better off
in a world with plea bargaining. Bargains provide these innocent defendants a means to escape their own process costs and receive light
unmaximized sentences, rather than endure full process and risk considerable posttrial sanctions. It is wholly secondary whether the lenient offers are normatively and systematically good or bad. For the innocent accused, it is enough that they exist. Lenient offers create
opportunities. A top-most normative demand should be to ensure
that the innocent have the same access to those opportunities. Of
course, even an abbreviated sentence and any brand of conviction of
the innocent is a systemic failure. The plea bargain, however, does
not create this failure; the false arrest and the prosecutorial decision
to make and carry out charges do. And, although the offer may seem
foolhardy to decline, the defendant-innocent or guilty-always retains the right to fight on for acquittal.
The question is pricklier in high-stakes cases. In these cases, all
defendants-innocent and guilty-are better off in a world without
plea bargaining, or, at least, in a world with fewer plea-bargaining
pressures. If prosecutors were unable to exploit overinclusive criminal
statutes to overcharge defendants, then there would be far less concern over de facto trial penalties. Nevertheless, it does not follow
from this objection that innocent defendants should have no right to
plead guilty in serious felony cases. The innocent would be at a great

defense counsel should not abandon persuasion unless and until the defendant understands the jeopardy of soldiering on. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 157, at 339 ("[O]ften
counsel can protect the client from disaster only by using a considerable amount of
persuasion to convince the client that a plea which the client instinctively disfavors is,
in fact, in his or her best interest."); Zeidman, supra note 291, at 905.
See, e.g., ABA, STANDARDS, supra note 214, at No. 14-3.2(c) cmt. at 124 ("It is, of
course, unprofessional conduct for the lawyer intentionally to understate or overstate
the risks, hazards, or prospects of the case to exert undue influence on the accused's
decision as to his or her plea." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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disadvantage if the culpable could plead guilty to avoid large sentence
disparities and rampant overcharging but the innocent could not.
Innocent defendants-particularly recidivists facing habitual-offender
statutes-would be obliged to bear all the risks but have no access to
the benefits. Innocent defendants who wanted to plead (but could
not) would be forced to face the potential double injustice of, first,
wrongful arrest and charge, and, second, a posttrial sentence far
lengthier than the unavailable plea-bargain sentence. Worse still, because recidivists are the most frequent innocent defendants and because trial biases make it particularly difficult for them to fight
charges, a guilty-plea bar would typically mandate trial for the very
type of innocent defendant least equipped to prevail.
The question of how to provide plea-bargaining access to the innocent is not adequately answered by the faulty and inconsistently
available Alford and nolo contendere doctrines. The question should
be answered instead by systemic recognition of false admissions as legal fictions. And defense attorneys should indulge no personal hesitation over such fictions where the guilty plea is the innocent defendant's voluntary choice and the manifest best option. When an
innocent defendant wishes to minimize exposure, either to a horrific
posttrial sentence or a burdensome pretrial process, that choice commands institutional respect.
The inevitable conclusion is that there may well be systemic innocence problems, but they are not problems with plea bargaining.

